THE MAN ON THE FLYING TRAPEZE
REVIEW ESSAY: JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS.
THE SUPREME COURT, 2010

Barry Cushman*
It now has been seventy-five years since President Franklin Roosevelt’s confrontation with the Supreme Court of the United States
reached its crisis. Throughout his first term, the President had
looked on with increasing frustration as the Court invalidated one after another of the central elements of his New Deal. The National
Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”), the Agricultural Adjustment Act
(“AAA”), farm debt relief legislation, railway pension legislation, and
key components of the Administration’s energy policy had been declared unconstitutional by aging justices whom Roosevelt regarded as
reactionary and out of touch. To Roosevelt and several of his advisors, the prospects that such important Second New Deal measures as
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and the Social Security
Act (“SSA”) could successfully run this judicial gauntlet seemed dim.
Yet during the first four years of his presidency, Roosevelt was stymied
by the lack of any opportunities to make his own appointments to the
Court and thereby to influence the course of American constitutional
law.
In 1936, however, Roosevelt won a resounding landslide reelection victory, earning the electoral votes of every state other than
Maine and Vermont. Emboldened by this remarkable showing of
public support, on February 5, 1937, the President urged Congress to
enact legislation that would have authorized him to appoint to the
Court a new justice for every sitting justice who had not retired within
six months of reaching his seventieth birthday. Because there were at
the time six sitting justices answering that description, the bill would
have enabled Roosevelt to appoint half a dozen new justices to the
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Court immediately, thereby enlarging its membership to fifteen. The
bill would meet with stiff resistance in Congress, and ultimately it
would not pass. But that spring the Court did hand down decisions
upholding a state minimum wage law for women, the NLRA, and the
SSA.
The story of the Court-packing fight and the associated “switch-intime that saved the Nine” has been told many times, but it continues
to fascinate lawyers, historians, and political scientists, and is retold
each year in countless high school, college, and law school courses.
Jeff Shesol, a former speechwriter for President Clinton who earned a
Master’s degree in history at Oxford, where he studied as a Rhodes
Scholar, tenders a substantial contribution to that body of literature
with his recent book, Supreme Power. Though the book is written so as
to be accessible to a general audience, and has been marketed accordingly, Mr. Shesol does engage with much of the academic literature on the subject, and seeks to position himself within that scholarly
corpus.
Any history of the Court-packing controversy sets out to answer
three principal questions. The first is how best to tell what I will call
the political story: how to understand the political trajectory of the
Plan from its initial conceptualization to its ultimate failure. The second is how best to tell what I will call the legal story: how to understand the constitutional landscape that confronted New Deal reformers, how they negotiated it, and how and in what respects the
Supreme Court transformed that body of constitutional law during
the Great Depression. The third is how to specify the relationship between these two stories. What effect, if any, did the events recounted
1
in the political story have on the legal story? Each of the three Parts
of this Article offers an evaluation of Mr. Shesol’s efforts to address
each of these questions. Part I discusses Mr. Shesol’s treatment of the
political story; Part II takes up his account of the legal story; and Part
III explores his analysis of the relationship between the two. I conclude that while Mr. Shesol does a very nice job with the first question, his efforts to answer the second and the third are not nearly so
successful.
I. THE POLITICAL STORY
Mr. Shesol’s presentation of the political story is the strongest part
of the book. His research is industrious and extensive; his prose
1

Of course, the converse also is important. See infra pp.193–98.
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composition is exceptionally skillful; and he has an admirable talent
for spinning a yarn and moving a story along. In the course of relating that story, he succeeds in identifying a number of its features that,
taken together, cast doubt on the prospects for the Plan’s ultimate
enactment, even in the very early days of the struggle. “[F]rom its
very first days,” Mr. Shesol reports, the fight “did not unfold as Roosevelt had expected. The actors in this national drama stubbornly refused to get on script.” (p. 307).
First, Mr. Shesol underscores the lack of public backing for Roosevelt’s proposal. It was “far from clear,” he reports, that “the American people supported Roosevelt on the issue of the Supreme Court.”
(p. 245). Numerous state legislatures passed resolutions condemning
the bill. (p. 351). A contemporary Gallup poll showed that
[t]hough nearly 60 percent of the public wanted the Court to take a
‘more liberal’ view of the New Deal, this did not equal a desire to curb
the Court: only 41 percent favored limits on judicial review . . . . And
when Americans were asked to name the nation’s most pressing issue,
2
neither the Court nor the Constitution even made the list.

(p. 246). Mr. Shesol regards this as “the cost of avoiding the issue in
1936.” (p. 246). Roosevelt had refrained from making the Court an
issue in the campaign in order to deny “ammunition to his opponents,” but at the same time had “also denied himself a valuable
chance to educate the public—to prepare it for what he might do
and enlist it in what many believed would be a difficult fight.” (p.
246)
The print media quickly came out against the bill en masse. As
Mr. Shesol relates:
A survey taken at the time showed that more than two thirds of the newspapers that had backed Roosevelt’s re-election in 1936 now opposed him
on the Court bill, and more than half of these did so “vigorously.” More
ominously, while pro-administration papers supporting the plan had a

2

Curiously, however, in the book’s concluding chapter Mr. Shesol insists that there was a
“wave of popular discontentment with the Supreme Court” that “crested in 1936, with an
outpouring of elite commentary, popular songs, pamphlets, and proposals in Congress to
curb the Court”; that “[b]y the time of Roosevelt’s second inauguration, there was a growing national consensus that something had to be done about the Court—that either Congress or, more likely, the president would have to act to end the impasse”; and that only
“[a]n embattled minority disputed this.” JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN
ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 508–09 (2010). This would not appear to be supported by the polls referenced in the text, nor by many other polls taken by Gallup and
Elmo Roper during this period. See Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public
Opinion and Constitutional Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 67–74 (2002) [hereinafter Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup]. As will become clear in Parts II and III, such inconsistencies plague other portions of Mr. Shesol’s account as well.
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combined circulation of 3.1 million, pro-administration papers opposing
it reached an audience that was four times larger.

(p. 301). The “prevailing opinion” on the nation’s editorial pages
was that “Roosevelt had hidden his plans” during the 1936 election,
that he had “‘been disingenuous with the people,’” and that he had
“‘double-crossed the country.’” (pp. 301–02). Somewhere between
60% and 80% of newspapers had opposed FDR’s re-election in 1936,
but “they were now nearly unanimous in condemning his Court plan.
The White House, in its ongoing survey of press reactions, did not
even bother to track arguments in favor of the plan, because they
were so few in number.” (p. 305).
Mr. Shesol explains that people were not persuaded by Roosevelt’s
initial attempt to explain the bill as necessary to enable the Court to
hear more cases than the aging justices could presently handle. (p.
302). They were put off by the plan’s “‘cleverness’” and its “whiff of
‘political trickery.’” They saw it as an attempt to make the Court a
“‘rubber stamp,’” and denounced it as a “con” and a “putsch,” a “dishonest” power grab, a “‘bloodless coup d’etat,’” an effort to create a
“dictatorship” like those of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin. It didn’t
help that the Plan was actually cheered by Il Duce and the Nazi press.
(pp. 302–03).
Congressional offices quickly found themselves overwhelmed, not only by
the volume of correspondence (Henry Ashurst received a thousand telegrams in a single day) but by the intensity of public opposition to the
plan. Only the merest handful of telegrams urged Congress to pass the
bill. Meanwhile, at the White House, the wires were distressingly quiet. . . . When the newspapers hit the stands on the morning of February
6, forecasting the bill’s fast track to passage, the prediction already felt
out of date. Clearly, now, there was going to be a fight. Not a feeble, pro
forma protest as the bill became law—as had often been the case since
1933—but a genuine fight . . . .

(pp. 305–06).
It was also “far from clear,” in Mr. Shesol’s view, that Congress
would support Roosevelt’s proposal. The President “had made no attempt to assess congressional attitudes toward any specific approach,
or even toward court reform generally.” (pp. 245–46). In fact, he
had kept congressional leaders in the dark about his plan, and he was
“a bit startled” by the hostile reaction that the Plan’s announcement
provoked in many of them. He had “failed to anticipate the rage,
hurt, humiliation, and betrayal that his Court-packing plan would unleash among his faithful—if often resentful—lieutenants,” many of
whom had been naively proposing “their own pet solutions to the
Court problem” in various public fora while Roosevelt was hatching
his Plan behind their backs. (pp. 307–08). “By 1937, FDR and the
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Democratic leadership were like an old, unhappily married couple,
nursing innumerable grievances but unwilling, or unable, to separate.” (p. 309). Within a week many of these disaffected Senate
Democrats had joined with every Senate Republican to form a body
of opposition to the Plan under the leadership of liberal Montana
Democrat Burton K. Wheeler. (pp. 323–24).
The bill was introduced in the Senate, Mr. Shesol explains, principally because Hatton Sumners, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
. . . had persuaded a majority of the Judiciary Committee to join him in
opposing the Court bill. Forecasts of a wide margin of support in the
House would mean nothing if Sumners were able to block the bill in
Committee. The White House, in that event, would have two alternatives: abandon the bill or dislodge it by force, suspending the rules and
forcing its way to the floor. Speaker Bankhead and Sam Rayburn, the
majority leader, pleaded with the president not to divide the House in
this way; the acrimony, they said, would be so extreme that it would
doom Court reform and a whole lot else.

(pp. 344–45). Shortly after the plan was announced, Sumners “called
a press conference and denounced the Court-packing plan as ‘infamous.’ Steve Early reported to Roosevelt that Sumners had been
‘savage in attack’ and gave the proposal ‘hell, specifically and generally.’” (pp. 343–44). James Roosevelt responded that Sumners “‘needs
to be straightened out,’” and on the morning of February 10, “FDR
met with Sumners in an attempt to do just that. ‘Didn’t make an awful lot of headway,’ James observed afterward.” (p. 344). Before
James met with Sumners, White House advisors were divided over
whether to “steamroll” the House Judiciary Committee Chairman—
the course favored by Keenan and Corcoran—or to “forgo standard
procedure” and instead introduce the bill in the Senate rather than
the House—the course preferred by Charlie West and House leaders.
James Roosevelt emerged from the meeting “inclined to avoid
Sumners altogether.” (p. 345).
Meanwhile, Sumners attempted “to weaken, modify, or possibly
supplant” the bill by pressing for enactment of his own bill permitting
justices to retire at full pay. (p. 342). The justices had been made
anxious by the Economy Bill of 1932, which had slashed Oliver Wendell Holmes’ pension in half; but for this concern, as Mr. Shesol
points out, “both Van Devanter and Sutherland would almost certainly have retired at the start of FDR’s presidency—and spared the nation the struggle that followed between its branches of government.”
(p. 342). Sumners had introduced such a judicial retirement bill in
1935 but the House perversely had rejected it. He reintroduced the
bill in January of 1937, “seeing it as an incentive for justices to retire
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and thereby end the crisis.” (p. 343). Within days of Roosevelt’s announcement of his plan, members of Congress would seize on
Sumners’ retirement bill “as an alternative to Court-packing and a
way out of the whole mess.” (p. 343). By February 10 the retirement
bill had passed the House by a vote of 315-75, and the Justices were
immediately notified of the House passage of the bill even as they
were hearing argument in the Wagner Act cases. Sumners immediately went to James Roosevelt and proposed that the retirement bill
be rushed to passage through the Senate, and that FDR then give him
six weeks to persuade at least two justices—presumably Van Devanter
and Sutherland—to retire. (pp. 343–44).
But throughout the Court fight, as Mr. Shesol so ably documents,
Roosevelt stubbornly refused to compromise with the opposition. In
mid-February, as FDR was approached with proposals for compromise, many observers were predicting that the bill would pass. (p.
329). The President remained optimistic that support for the plan
would grow as people came to understand it better. Congressmen
were now receiving more mail in support of the plan; internal polling
in the House revealed a solid majority in favor; the Senate was equally
divided, and of the third of Senators yet to commit one way or the
other, nearly all were Democrats. “Little wonder, then, that when
congressional leaders approached the president about seeking a
compromise, they found him unyielding.” (p. 331).
But Mr. Shesol insists that these early predictions that the bill
would pass were “all a bit premature.” Polls of the public showed that
the opposition had “a slight advantage.” (p. 330). By February 15,
Roosevelt’s Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau gave the bill at
3
best a 50-50 chance of passage. Accordingly, many in Congress were
engaged in a “frantic search” for some middle ground. (p. 345).
“Nearly every faction—the bill’s reluctant supporters, its nervous opponents, and those too afraid to take a stand either way—was eager to
avert an all-out fight.” (p. 345). Perhaps the Sumners bill would
solve the problem; if not, perhaps some form of constitutional
amendment might do the trick. But FDR “showed no interest in
making concessions to Sumners, or anyone else, for that matter.” (p.
345). James Roosevelt doubted that Sumners could deliver the promised retirements, and thought it better political strategy in any event
“to have the President put through his own plan.” And FDR was “un-

3

Henry S. Morgenthau, Jr., Diaries (microfilm), The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde
Park, New York, Book 55, p. 95, quoted in LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL
BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT 47 (1967).
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impressed by any of the alternatives being discussed in Congress.” (p.
345). He “had already considered—and rejected—all these possibilities. . . . Having spent two years examining almost every conceivable
amendment to the Constitution, Roosevelt was well-armed (and in4
clined) to shoot down each proposal.” (pp. 345–46).
For example, Mr. Shesol reports that Roosevelt’s “friend Charles
C. Burlingham, the reform-minded grand old man of the New York
bar,” had been “outspoken” in favor of a constitutional amendment.
(p. 347). “On February 19, dismayed by the Court plan, Burlingham
wrote and urged the president to change course.” “Dear Franklin,”
he wrote,
I haven’t bothered you for quite a spell.
You can’t feel more strongly than I about the majority opinions, especially AAA, Minimum Wage and Roberts J.’s silly talk about railroad
pensions. BUT I don’t like your method. I suppose you are in a hurry
and this is your Congress. It’s all very well to refer to previous changes in
the size of the Court . . . the appointment of Bradley and Strong by President Grant . . . [but] the episode . . . has always been regarded as more
or less scandalous and discreditable to Grant.
Let me give you a plan that would work:
1. Pass the retirement bill so that no justice can be treated as scurvily
as Holmes was.
2. Pass a joint resolution . . . for an Amendment making retirement at
75 compulsory. This, however, should not apply to the present sitting
justices. I am confident that if such a joint resolution is passed, all the
justices over 75—Brandeis, Hughes, Van Devanter and McReynolds—

4

FDR also faced resistance from several of the most liberal members of his party, some of
whom thought that his plan did not get at the root of the problem. “When Roosevelt
launched his Court plan, he had expected liberals to see it as moderate, practical, achievable—and preferable, therefore, to amending the Constitution. Many did view it that
way. But two weeks into the fight, the president could see that the plan left some liberals
cold, whether because they were concerned about the possible threat it posed to the system of checks and balances, or because they believed that the real problem was not this
particular group of justices but judicial power per se. Hence the continuing appeal, on
the left, of a constitutional amendment. . . . [S]ome on the left—inclined, as a general
matter, toward moral or political absolutes—insisted on “an amendment or nothing.” In
their view the time had come, after decades of judicial arrogance, for a storming of the
citadel. To “the more ardent New Dealers,” as the New Republic explained, Roosevelt’s
plan was “deeply disappointing.” They “had dug in their heels for a great constitutional
tug-of-war”—a “glorious” struggle to subdue the Court permanently by limiting or perhaps eliminating judicial review. They had no patience for an approach that they saw as a
mere expedient and, worse, as a substitute for real reform. “They are opposing the President’s plan,” complained Robert H. Jackson, “because they want to get an amendment
that will end judicial power.” Though they constituted no more than a small minority,
even among liberals, their numbers were great enough—and their volume high
enough—to provide cover for conservatives whose real agenda was to defeat any kind of
judicial reform.” SHESOL, supra note 2, at 346.
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would retire without waiting for the adoption of the Amendment itself. . . . It would not be decent for them to hang on after Congress had
adopted such a resolution.

(p. 347). But Roosevelt resisted the Amendment proposal on the
ground that it would be difficult to get agreement on the language, it
would be next to impossible to get the requisite two-thirds majorities
in both houses of Congress, and it would be equally challenging to
secure ratification by the requisite number of states—a point he
made both to Burlingham and to Senators pressing for an amendment strategy. (p. 348). The bottom line was that there would be
“no deals, no compromises.” (p. 345).
Instead, Mr. Shesol informs us, FDR hoped to use the levers of
patronage to sway wavering or opposing Senators. (pp. 353–54). But
this strategy proved unsuccessful. For example, Republican Senator
Gerald Nye of North Dakota gave a speech condemning the plan
even after FDR called him to the White House and made veiled
threats to withhold federal funds. (p. 354). There were several reasons for the ineffectiveness of this strategy. First, many Senators harbored hopes of becoming judges eventually, and were therefore protective of the judiciary.
Few wished to serve on a neutered court; and few doubted that this
would be the effect of the Court bill. For this and other reasons—among
them, Roosevelt’s wish for a balanced budget, which would necessarily
curtail the number of government projects—the lure of patronage and
federal largess was neither as strong nor as enticing as it once had been.
“The [Supreme Court] issue was too big,” noted Alsop and Catledge;
“the senators were too much excited by it to be affected by the petty political bullying and legal bribery which are ordinarily so useful to all administrations.”
And Roosevelt was not an especially good bully. Though willing to
play the patronage game, there were limits to how far he would go.
Veiled threats were one thing; following through another. When Tom
Corcoran urged him to “play rough” with Henry Ashurst—the Judiciary
Committee chairman whose support for the bill, despite his public statements, was in doubt—Roosevelt refused. Like Nye’s North Dakota,
Ashurst’s home state of Arizona was at that time essentially a piece of
federal property; its economy was highly dependent on government subsidies. Tom Corcoran advised Roosevelt to shut off the spigots. “I never
quite understood how the President failed . . . to use his power in this instance,” Corcoran said later. But Roosevelt had little taste for this brand
of politics. He knew that when the Court fight was over, he would need
to rely on Ashurst again. “I don’t devour them in the end,” Roosevelt
told a close Senate ally.

(pp. 354–55).
Meanwhile, as Mr. Shesol makes clear, the Senate opposition was
not playing beanbag.
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Every day, in a hidden corner of the Capitol, the opposition forces met to
compare notes, make adjustments in strategy, and get their latest orders
from Wheeler. Roosevelt might have the powers of the presidency, but
Wheeler and his men had experience, ability, and the significant advantage of fighting a battle on their own terrain. With ruthless, remorseless efficiency, they waged a campaign of what Wheeler called “intensive
lobbying.” What this meant was that each member of the “steering
committee” was assigned to the uncommitted senators he knew best and
then stalked them like quarry—in the Capitol, the cloakroom, the Senate
Office Building, at cocktail parties, at stag dinners. Committee members
made the usual arguments about the Court and the Constitution but also—perhaps with greater force—stoked their colleagues’ fears of dominance by an all-powerful president and of the next wave of New Deal legislation, more radical than the last, and unchecked by the Court.

(p. 355).
It was not clear, by contrast, that the Senate leaders supporting
the plan really had their hearts in the fight. As Mr. Shesol reports,
“the best intelligence” that Wheeler and his colleagues obtained
“came from the other side. Leslie Biffle, an assistant to Joe Robinson,
called Wheeler every night to share his knowledge of which senator
was leaning which way.” Wheeler “‘never knew for certain’” why Biffle would have done this, but speculated that Robinson “himself had
been behind it—perhaps in an attempt to strengthen the opposition
and force Roosevelt to compromise. ‘Robinson,’ said Wheeler, ‘had
no more stomach for the Court-packing fight than we did.’” (p. 356).
But as Mr. Shesol points out, “Wheeler, of course, had plenty of
stomach for the fight.” (p. 356).
Mr. Shesol observes that supporters were also burdened by the
weakness of the case for the plan set out in Roosevelt’s initial message. (p. 367). In a February 22 message to the President, Robert
Jackson warned that public support for the proposal was declining in
part due to the manner in which it had been framed. He urged Roosevelt to make the argument in favor of the bill in simpler and more
candid terms. Roosevelt agreed with this critique in a meeting a few
days later, but he had taken “three weeks to admit this mistake—
three crucial, costly weeks—ample time for his credibility to be battered, enemies emboldened, and goals put at risk.” (p. 368). By early
March, little progress had been made. As “Democrats slashed at
Democrats” in this “family quarrel,” there was “stalemate, reflecting
the frustration and futility of ‘trench warfare.’” (p. 371). A March 1
Gallup poll showed sentiment against the plan running 48-41. “But
mail to members of Congress seemed to point in the other direction.
Neither side, in short, had much to show for a month’s worth of making speeches.” (pp. 371–72).
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A few days after the President had unveiled his proposal, Raymond Clapper had “typed a note to himself on Scripps-Howard letterhead: ‘If Rvt does go to country on this, will know he really worried.’” (p. 307) Now, a month into the fight, Roosevelt took his
revised case to the public with renewed vigor. At a March 4 Democratic Victory Dinner, Roosevelt criticized the Court for invalidating
numerous New Deal measures and indulging its “‘personal economic
predilections’ . . . that we live in a nation where there is no legal power anywhere to deal with its most difficult practical problems—a No
Man’s Land of final futility.” (p. 375). The President concluded by
calling on his feuding fellow Democrats to take the steps necessary to
“‘make democracy succeed . . . now!’” (p. 376). Mr. Shesol reports
that the Plan’s supporters were “overjoyed” by this “fighting speech,”
but most editorial reaction “was negative, and harshly so.” And Democratic opponents of the plan were alienated by FDR’s insistence on
party loyalty and his implication that they were “essentially one and
the same with the Republicans, Liberty Leaguers, economic royalists,
and ‘defeatist lawyers’ who had aligned against him in 1936. Outraged, these Democrats resolved to work even harder to expose the
‘innate wickedness’ of packing the Court. If the president kept
fighting for his plan, they said, they might well bolt the party.” (pp.
376–77).
The President followed this performance with a Fireside Chat
broadcast five days later, in which he forcefully argued that the Court
had been “‘acting not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making
body. . . . —a super-legislature.’” (p. 380). The present Court was
suffering from “hardening of the judicial arteries.” It was necessary,
he insisted, to “‘take action to save the Constitution from the Court
and the Court from itself.’” (p. 380). He rejected proposals for a
constitutional amendment giving Congress greater regulatory power,
Mr. Shesol notes, because of “the difficulties of drafting an amendment, building consensus for it, ratifying it, and getting it to survive
the justices’ scrutiny.” (pp. 381–82). Enactment of the Courtpacking bill was the only viable solution.
In the immediate wake of these two speeches, Mr. Shesol maintains,
[S]upport for the plan had begun to climbonly marginally, but for the
White House, the trend was encouraging. Senators’ mail, too, showed
the shift. . . .
The Senate opposition was getting nervous . . . . Hiram Johnson
wrote his son that “they are picking off occasional men from the opposition,” enough, he believed, to pass the bill by a comfortable margin.
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(p. 386). “Momentum was building; events were conspiring to help
pass the bill. Even a growing domestic crisis—the gathering storm of
labor unrest” manifested in a wave of sit-down strikes at factories
around the country—“appeared to strengthen the case for Courtpacking.” (p. 387). “Roosevelt’s opponents, despite steadily lengthening odds, kept fighting.” (p. 388). But the Administration was increasingly optimistic, believing that the tide had turned and that the
5
opposition was breaking down and losing ground. (p. 390).
This optimism led the Administration to conclude its testimony in
the hearings on the bill being held before the Senate Judiciary
Committee on March 20, after only two weeks. Mr. Shesol relates
that “Corcoran and Keenan had come to a strongly held view that
opposition senators were, in effect, filibustering—asking long-winded,
elliptical questions, repeating themselves and one another (even
more than usual), on and on, day after day.” (p. 391). The Administration therefore rejected the opposition’s offer to allow them to
put on more witnesses, viewing it as an effort to trick the bill’s proponents into assisting the opposition in drawing out the hearings. But
Judiciary Committee chairman Henry Ashurst, who was privately opposed to the bill, was perfectly content to allow the opposition to put
on as many witnesses as it cared to (pp. 383–84), and this enabled
opposition forces to dominate the headlines for the following
6
month.
The first witness to testify for the opposition was its leader, Senator Burton Wheeler. Over the preceding weekend, Wheeler had induced Chief Justice Hughes to prepare a letter, approved by Justices
Van Devanter and Brandeis, which rebutted point by point each of
the arguments Roosevelt had made in support of the bill in his initial
7
message. After some preliminary niceties, as Mr. Shesol recounts,
Wheeler dramatically removed the document from his suit pocket
and began to read from it. (pp. 393–97). “There is no congestion of
cases upon our calendar,” wrote Hughes. “This gratifying condition
has obtained for several years.”8 To Roosevelt’s claim that the Court
5

6
7
8

Contra MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL
WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 356 (2002) (“There was little indication that
the two March addresses changed anything. Robert Jackson later claimed that none of
the speeches during the court fight did much to convince people to change their minds
about the proposal. . . . Instead of making decisive gains, the administration was losing
the battle for public opinion and majorities in Congress.”).
JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, at 124 (1938).
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 124–26; BAKER, supra note 3, at 153–56.
Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1392,
75th Cong. 488 (1937) (statement of Sen. Burton K. Wheeler).
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had been denying certiorari in too many cases, Hughes replied that
the Court had instead been too liberal in its grants. Most of the petitions that the Court had denied, Hughes maintained, were so utterly
without merit that they never should have been presented for review.
The addition of new justices, Hughes concluded,
[A]part from any question of policy, which I do not discuss, would not
promote the efficiency of the Court. It is believed that it would impair
that efficiency so long as the Court acts as a unit. There would be more
judges to hear, more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more
judges to be convinced and to decide. The present number of justices is
thought to be large enough so far as the prompt, adequate, and efficient
9
conduct of the work of the Court is concerned.

To some, this critique of Roosevelt’s attack on the Court’s efficiency was not unfamiliar. Mr. Shesol reminds us that Hughes had
given much of the information his letter contained to Washington Post
columnist Franklyn Waltman in an off-the-record interview on February 5, the day that Roosevelt had unveiled the Plan. (p. 394). “Keeping his source confidential, Waltman turned this research into a devastating series of front-page articles debunking the central claim of
FDR’s message.” (pp. 395). Justice Stone also “had sent factual material to journalists to help them puncture the notion that the justices
were overburdened.” (p. 399). Yet editorial comment in the next
morning’s newspapers saw the Hughes letter as dealing the Administration a stunning, perhaps devastating blow. (p. 397). “When
Wheeler finally rose from the witness chair, committee members who
supported the Court plan furiously scribbled rebuttals, while opponents, for the first time in two weeks of hearings, smiled beatifically.”
(p. 394). Vice-President Garner reportedly telephoned FDR at Warm
10
Springs, Georgia, and told him, “[w]e’re licked.”
Hughes himself later wrote that his letter “‘appears to have had a
devastating effect.’” (p. 400). Others have shared this view. Brandeis
biographer Melvin Urofsky maintains that “[t]he reading of
11
[Hughes’s] letter marked the end of the court-packing bill . . . .”
And contemporary observers later expressed their concurrence with
Hughes’s assessment. As Mr. Shesol reports: “Rex Tugwell believed
that the letter ‘so conclusively refuted the arguments Franklin had
made in his message . . . that it ended any chance for passage the bill
might have had.’” (p. 400). Similarly, “Robert Jackson judged that
9
10
11

Id. at 488–91 (1937) (statement of Sen. Burton K. Wheeler).
BAKER, supra note 3, at 159–60; BURTON K. WHEELER & PAUL F. HEALY, YANKEE FROM THE
WEST 333 (1962).
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 166 (Oscar
Handlin ed., 1981).
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the letter ‘pretty much turned the tide.’” (p. 400). But Mr. Shesol is
inclined to discount those appraisals as coming “long after the fact.”
(p. 400). In what may have been some brave talk, Jackson wrote that
even after Wheeler’s testimony there was “‘no question that the President’s plan will go through’—as well he might,” adds Mr. Shesol.
As Ickes had seen, the Hughes letter had laid waste to an abandoned fortress. It left untouched and perhaps even reinforced the argument Roosevelt was now making with increasing force: that the Supreme Court was
a political body, and willing to cross the bounds of precedent and propriety to oppose him at any cost. That point, Hughes had made persuasively.
12

(p. 401).
If Wheeler’s March 22 testimony dampened the Plan’s prospects,
the effect of the Court’s March 29 decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish13 was arguably even more substantial. “[I]t was obvious,” wrote
Leonard Baker, “that the decision upholding the minimum wage
would make it more difficult to push FDR’s Court plan through the
Senate. . . . Particularly after the Roberts switch, there was no nationwide desire for altering the Court, and, as a result, no great desire in
14
Congress either.” “By April,” concluded James MacGregor Burns,
15
“the chances for the court plan were almost nil.” Yet in its immediate aftermath, some of the participants remained unsure which way
the Parrish decision cut. As Mr. Shesol reports,
[B]oth sides claimed vindication: to Robinson, the Parrish decision
showed the importance of having the right men—and more of them—on
the bench; to Wheeler, it revealed the Court’s capacity to correct itself. . . . Parrish had scrambled the pieces. In the days after the Court’s
reversal, no one could tell which side stood to gain politically. The deci-

12

13
14
15

Contra MCKENNA, supra note 5, at 376 (“The initial indirection that Hughes exposed may
have been tacitly abandoned in the presidential addresses of March 4 and 9, but in the
public mind it was still fresh. The effect of the letter was ‘to show up for good and all as
utterly hollow the smooth propositions with which the President had offered his bill. The
opposition’s gain in the debate was tremendous.’”). As Harold Ickes put it, FDR had
“‘abandoned this ground some time ago, but shrewdly Hughes chose to fight his skirmish
where we were the weakest.’” Id. at 377. The fortress had not been abandoned by Attorney General Homer Cummings, who in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee “relied in the main on his original rationale for the plan as a managerial solution
to the Court’s inefficiency . . . . [T]he first impression given the public of [FDR’s] reasons
for the plan—the overburdened Court and its congested docket—was hard to erase, particularly when that impression was reinforced by Cummings’ testimony before the Judiciary Committee.” ROBERT SHOGAN, BACKLASH: THE KILLING OF THE NEW DEAL 170, 174
(2006).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
BAKER, supra note 3, at 179, 191.
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sion’s impact on the Court bill—and vice versa—was a matter of intense
debate.

(pp. 409−10).
Cummings took the view that the Court had yielded to the pressure of events, which vindicated FDR’s plan.
[T]he Chicago Daily Tribune proclaimed that the Parrish ruling “Wrecks
Argument for Packing Supreme Court.” Both contentions were plausible. It was certainly possible, as some claimed, that in the span of a single
week, the Hughes letter and the Hughes opinion had blunted FDR’s
momentum. Unless they fueled it by reinforcing the argument that the
Court was a political body. As William Borah wrote to an associate on
March 30, “the situation here is difficult to diagnose. . . . We do not know
‘where we are at.’”

(p. 410).
It would not take long, however, to see which way the wind was
blowing. Shortly after the delivery of the Parrish opinion, the polls
began to reveal a precipitous decline in the Plan’s already troubled
16
popular reception. And as for the situation in the Senate, there was
a telling event at the Gridiron Dinner held on April 10, two days before the announcement of the Court’s decisions upholding the National Labor Relations Act. “Late in the evening, just before the salad
course,” Mr. Shesol reports,
[A] chorus of journalists assembled on stage. They pointed in unison to
Chief Justice Hughes, who sat, smiling broadly, at the high table. Then,
in unison, they sang “Happy Birthday to You.” The next day, Hughes
would turn seventy-five. When the song was through, the Gridiron Dinner guests—among them Wheeler, Connally, Ashurst, and Sumners—
rose in a standing ovation that lasted a very long time. Long enough to
make its point clear.

(p. 428).
Meanwhile, at the hearings, the leisurely Chairman Ashurst continued to preside
. . . with relish over a variety performance of labor leaders and farm un17
ion officials, law school deans, columnists, historians, stockbrokers,

16
17

See Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup, supra note 2, at 67–70.
At page 329, Mr. Shesol argues that labor and farm groups lined up solidly behind the
plan, but this is inconsistent with the reports of other scholars, who have noted that not
only the Grange, but also the Farmers’ Union, the National Cooperative Council, and the
Farm Bureau all came out against the Plan. SHESOL, supra note 2, at 329; see also ALSOP &
CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 59, 115–17, 164–76, 181; BAKER, supra note 3, at 86–88;
MCKENNA, supra note 5, at 381–83; 2 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 753 (1951)
[hereinafter PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES]. Indeed, Mr. Shesol later notes that Roosevelt’s acquiescence in the sit-down strikes “earned him little tangible support for his plan.
Unions generally—not just the CIO—were making all the right noises and endorsing the
bill, but their actions, to date, had been paltry.” SHESOL, supra note 2, at 424.
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presidents of patriotic societies, theologians, bishops, and rabbis—united
only by their abhorrence of the Court-packing plan. Roosevelt’s decision
to cede the stage to this motley collection of antagonists had proven a
mistake. Opposition senators turned out to be shrewd in their selection
and skillful in their coaching of witnesses—who provided, week after
week, an earnest, instructive, and often entertaining filibuster against the
president’s plan. Ashurst, despite his pledge to support the bill, showed
no inclination to hurry things along.

(p. 417).
Corcoran—who more than anyone had pressed for an early end to the
administration’s testimony—still talked big about “breaking” the opposition, but as the weeks passed, the hearings, along with his other responsibilities, took a toll on his confidence and his health. His weight shot up
twenty-five pounds. He grew exasperated with Ashurst. The chairman, in
his view, “was deliberately extending the hearings until such time as the
public could be whipped up to think of Roosevelt as a dictator.” Or,
more likely, until an event of some kind—a Court decision, a retirement—tipped the balance in favor of the opposition. Three times, Roosevelt’s supporters on the committee tried—and failed —to shut down
the hearings. After the first attempt, at the end of March, opponents responded by scheduling fifty more witnesses.

(p. 421). The President, however, “appeared untroubled. He wrote
Frankfurter on April 5 that . . . ‘[i]t is quite clear that the utter confusion of our opponents among themselves means success for us even
though it may be deferred until June or July.’” (p. 421).
This “overconfidence” (p. 417) left Roosevelt unwilling to compromise even after the Court had upheld the NLRA on April 12.
Opposition leaders now pronounced the Court bill “dead”—there
was now, they argued, no reason for the president to seek additional
justices. In Mr. Shesol’s view,
The moment was ripe for a compromise on the Court plan. Supporters
did not know if they had the votes to pass the bill, opponents were un18
sure whether they had the numbers to kill it, and both sides were exhausted by their two-month-long siege. Both were also anxious about the
political consequences (of either crossing the president or standing by
him) and eager to move on to other, pressing business, of which there
was no shortage. The Court fight had created a terrible bottleneck of urgently needed legislation. . . . The 75th Congress was farther behind in
the appropriations process than any Congress in a generation: only one
of eleven spending bills had been passed.

18

But see MCKENNA, supra note 5, at 430 (“The Wagner Act rulings . . . dealt a crushing blow
to the court bill.”). At about that time, “an informal poll of senators disclosed that a majority would vote against the court bill.” Id. at 420. “After the Wagner Act decisions, even
FDR’s close White House aides began losing confidence in the bill’s chances for passage
and counseled retreat.” Id. at 441.
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(p. 435). But such “leaders of the revolt” as Wheeler, Edward Burke,
and William Borah “fiercely regarded adding even ‘two [justices] as
bad in principle as six’”; and though Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson and others urged FDR to seize the opportunity for compromise, the President refused to do so. (pp. 435–36).
At this point, Mr. Shesol relates, “Roosevelt could see that in the
Senate, the margin for the plan was narrow. He had begun to worry
that Robinson would agree to a compromise without consulting him.”
(p. 439). Support continued to deteriorate throughout the month of
19
April. By April 23, when the Judiciary Committee concluded its
hearings, it was clear that a majority of its members opposed the bill
20
and was preparing to write a critical report. Roosevelt summoned
Ashurst to the White House to try to persuade him to report the bill
“without recommendation.” Ashurst and Robinson looked into the
21
matter, and determined that it was “not feasible.” By the beginning
of May, the opposition’s steering committee had concluded that they
22
commanded an absolute majority in the Senate. And the most recent Gallup poll “showed declining support for the plan.” (p. 441).
But while the President responded by adjourning to the Gulf of
Mexico for a fishing vacation, Mr. Shesol places Tommy Corcoran
“back in Washington, having a case of nerves. Since February, he had
been swaggering around town, boasting that ‘the thing is in the bag.’
In reality, the steady drone of the hearings and the drumbeat of
gloom from Senate leaders had sapped his confidence.” (pp. 441–
42).
[Corcoran] huddled with Ben Cohen and Robert Jackson to devise a new
strategy. The three men agreed that Roosevelt should drop the bill for
now and take it up next session, by which time he could line up sufficient
support. To save face, the White House could say that the Court’s switch
had deferred—but not eliminated—the need for “new blood.” Joseph
Keenan and Charlie West, the two members of the strategy board in closest contact with congressional leaders, both agreed that this was best.

(p. 442).
On May 3, before the Social Security Cases23 even had been argued,
19

20
21
22
23

ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 163; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
Supreme Court ‘Packing’ Plan, in WILMON H. DROZE, GEORGE WOLFSKILL & WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, ESSAYS ON THE NEW DEAL 97 (Harold M. Hollingsworth & William F.
Holmes eds., 1969).
BAKER, supra note 3, at 193; Court Bill Faces a Committee Veto, Ashurst Concedes, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1937, at 1.
HENRY FOUNTAIN ASHURST, A MANY-COLORED TOGA: THE DIARY OF HENRY FOUNTAIN
ASHURST 374 (George Sparks ed., 1962).
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 201.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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James Roosevelt found himself cornered by Joe Robinson, Alben Barkley,
and Pat Harrison in a Capitol hideaway office. The senators told him in
no uncertain terms that the president had lost the fight for six additional
justices, and that, by refusing to face the truth, he was tearing apart the
Democratic Party. “Mr. Roosevelt,” said Robinson, “you tell your poppa
that he’d better leave this whole thing to us to get what we can out of it.
We’ll do our best for him.”

(p. 442). But even against these increasingly formidable odds, FDR
still rebuffed all overtures of compromise. (pp. 442–43).
Then, on May 18—nearly a week before the announcement of the
Court’s decisions in the Social Security Cases—two events conspired to
further dim the prospects for passage of a bill that Wheeler had already declared dead more than a month before. The first event,
timed to coincide with the second, was Justice Van Devanter’s announcement that he would retire at the end of the term. (pp. 444–
48). This timely intervention by the aging justice
. . . had its intended effect. A cartoon in the Washington Post pictured a
grim-faced Van Devanter, pistol in hand, shooting an anthropomorphized Court bill in the head—to thumbs-up approval from the Senate
opposition. In Congress and the press (if not, it appeared, in the country), the calls for FDR either to make major concessions on the bill or
give it up altogether reached a high and steady pitch.

(pp. 447–48).
That same day the Senate Judiciary Committee voted against recommending passage of the bill by a vote of 10-8. “The Democrats
split evenly, denying Roosevelt even a slight majority of members of
his own party.” (p. 446). The Committee’s report was “caustic, contemptuous, and apocalyptic . . . . It laid waste to every premise, provision, and stated purpose of the bill, granting nothing to Roosevelt,
not even the good faith of his intentions.” (p. 467). “‘[W]e would
rather have an independent Court,’” the report declared,
‘. . . a fearless Court, a Court that will dare to announce its honest opinions in what it believes to be the defense of the liberties of the people,
than a Court that, out of fear or sense of obligation to the appointing
power, or factional passion, approves any measure we may enact. . . . We
recommend the rejection of this bill as a needless, futile, and utterly
dangerous abandonment of constitutional principle. . . . It is a measure
which should be so emphatically rejected that its parallel will never again
be presented to the free representatives of the free people of America.’

(pp. 468–69).
In the immediate wake of this stern rebuke, Mr. Shesol reports
that “the committee
. . . then delivered a second blow to the proposal and Roosevelt’s prestige. Despite Roosevelt’s hard line against compromise, all but one of
the bill’s supporters voted for a substitute measure, put forth by Marvel
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Logan and backed by Joe Robinson, to allow a temporary increase in the
number of justices at the rate of no more than one a year . . . .

(p. 446). Yet even this compromise proposal was defeated by a vote
of 10-8, which cast doubt over Joe Robinson’s claim a month earlier
that he could get the President “a couple of extra justices tomorrow,”
(p. 436) and indeed over the possibility of any future compromise.
Mr. Shesol recounts that in the days following the committee vote
and Justice Van Devanter’s retirement announcement, the President’s aides came to see that the bill was in deep trouble. (pp. 451–
53). But after the Court handed down its decisions upholding the
Social Security Act, the hopes for reaching any sort of compromise
with the opposition seemed to be slipping away.
Compromise in whatever form had appealed to both sides when it
seemed to offer the only way out—that is, the only way short of giving the
president exactly what he wanted. But now that the original plan was
dead, and goodwill toward Roosevelt was on the wane, the battle for halfmeasures was distinctly uphill. While public support for FDR’s six-judge
plan now stood at 40%—the lowest level yet—only 42% favored a twojudge substitute.

(p. 464). This did not incline opposition Senators “to abandon entrenched positions.” (p. 464).
Nor, it appears, did Roosevelt’s mishandling of the appointment
of Van Devanter’s successor. (pp. 448–51). It was widely known that
during the Hundred Days of 1933, as Joe Robinson “labored to pass
programs in which he did not believe,” Roosevelt had promised his
Senate Majority Leader the first vacant seat on the Supreme Court.
(p. 309). On May 18, when news of Van Devanter’s announcement
reached the Capitol, the popular Senator’s colleagues had gathered
around him in warm congratulation. Yet to Robinson’s great consternation, the White House remained distant and silent on the subject. Roosevelt believed that Robinson would vote as a conservative
on the Court, and his appointment therefore would not advance the
President’s constitutional agenda. Members of Roosevelt’s staff even
began to circulate rumors that Robinson would not be the nominee.
The Administration left the humiliated Robinson dangling for nearly
two weeks before calling him to the White House and assuring him
that the seat would be his once the Court legislation had been enact24
ed.
Roosevelt’s well-known promise to Robinson helps to explain why
the President was so reluctant throughout the fight to agree to a
compromise involving two or three additional justices, and why in24

ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 209–15.
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formed and thoughtful observers would have understood this. To see
the point, assume no retirements from among the justices comprising
the Court in February of 1937. Under these circumstances, if Robinson returned to his conservative roots once he enjoyed life tenure on
the bench, a two-justice deal would offer FDR no net gain. Even with
the appointment of a New Dealer to offset Robinson’s vote, what had
been 5-4 or 6-3 decisions against the New Deal might now be adverse
votes of 6-5 or 7-4. Even a three-judge compromise was not without
its hazards. “A 6-6 decision might well affirm by an equally divided
Court an unfavorable decision of a lower federal or state court; and if
Hughes, Roberts, and Robinson all voted with the Four Horsemen,25
26
the Administration would be handed defeat by a vote of 7-5.” Thus,
James Roosevelt was unpersuaded by Hatton Sumners’ February alternative plan to enact his judicial pension bill and then convince at
least two justices (presumably Van Devanter and Sutherland, both of
whom were known to be anxious to leave the bench) to retire. As the
junior Roosevelt wrote of Sumners’ proposal in his diary, no doubt
mindful of the promise to Robinson, “‘It wouldn’t really cure the situation even if he succeeds. . . .’” (p. 345) Even after the President
had replaced two of the Four Horsemen, the Administration would
still be faced with the possibility of an adverse majority comprised by
McReynolds, Butler, Hughes, Roberts, and Robinson. As the President remarked, “‘If I had three vacancies, I might be able to sandwich
in Joe Robinson.” But it would be necessary that all of those vacancies be created by the retirements of conservative justices in order to
27
assure FDR of a working majority on a nine-member Court.
Indeed, the promise to Robinson is the key to understanding why,
until Van Devanter retired in May, Roosevelt felt that he could not
settle for fewer than six additional justices. Again, let us take the personnel of the Court as Roosevelt found it in early 1937. In Roosevelt’s view, the Court’s decisions between 1934 and 1936 must have
suggested that Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler—
the Four Horsemen—were very likely to vote to invalidate New Deal
legislation. Decisions from that same period also suggested that both
Hughes and Roberts were at best unreliable. Add to their number

25

26

27
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Robinson, to whom FDR had promised his first appointment to the
Court, and that made for an unacceptable probability of seven adverse votes. Even if the Administration managed to hold the votes of
Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo—as it had not always done—the President would need an additional five appointments in order to ensure
a razor-thin 8-7 majority; and even that would be assured only if none
of his other five appointments gave him an unwelcome surprise after
being invested with life tenure. Once Van Devanter had announced
his retirement, this calculation changed, but only slightly. Now Robinson’s appointment meant only six likely hostile justices, which
meant that only four additional new appointments would be necessary to secure a 7-6 majority. And so, when Roosevelt finally summoned Robinson to the White House to assure him that Van Devanter’s seat would be his once a substitute bill had been enacted, he told
the Senator that “if there was to be a bride there must also be
28
bridesmaids—at least four of them.”
Roosevelt’s shabby treatment of Robinson outraged many of his
colleagues in the Senate, contributing to what Arthur Krock called an
“‘era of ill-feeling.’” (p. 457). “Had Roosevelt declared himself willing to compromise right after the Van Devanter announcement,” Mr.
Shesol maintains, “the Senate, grateful for the president’s good sense,
might well have granted him a face-saving solution. But the two-week
period in which he had let Robinson dangle had cost FDR dearly.”
(p. 463). As Mr. Shesol reports, “Roosevelt’s relationship with Congress was worse than it had ever been; his standing on Capitol Hill
was at its lowest ebb.” (p. 457). Congressmen saw the President as
“imperious,” refusing to listen, “‘laughingly’” dismissive of their counsel.
What had begun as a struggle between the president and the Court was
now a struggle between the president and Congress. Senators, in significant numbers, were finally prepared to make a stand. “We have retreated
from one battle to the other during the last four years,” one told a reporter. “But this is Gettysburg.”

(pp. 457–58).
It was at this point that Roosevelt invited all of the male Democratic members of Congress to a weekend “harmony meeting” of summer
sun and fun at the party’s Chesapeake Bay retreat, the Jefferson Island Club. Most attended, and the social occasion “was a success” in
mending fences and smoothing over differences with several fellow
Democrats. (p. 474). The Jefferson Island retreat, Mr. Shesol main28

2 THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE INSIDE STRUGGLE, 1936–1939, at 153
(1954).
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tains, earned FDR “the benefit of the doubt. Animus no longer
flowed so freely in his direction. This was not merely a measure of his
charm; it reflected the degree to which he had been chastened.” (pp.
477–78). Roosevelt relinquished “control” over the contents of the
bill to Robinson (p. 478), who along with “Democratic moderates on
both sides of the contest began to cast about for another solution—
some way to settle the matter short of an ugly, intraparty brawl on the
nation’s center stage.” (p. 476). “Not all of FDR’s opponents, after
all, wanted him humiliated and permanently weakened; many senators were looking for a way to remain in his good graces.” (p. 477).
By late June the Washington Post was insisting that opposition voices had been “‘entirely too optimistic in their assumption that the
court-packing plan is dead.’ Newspapers reported that fifty-four senators had lined up behind” (p. 474) a compromise bill that left the
President with half a loaf, and yet constituted a “retreat” on his part.
The substitute bill would have allowed the President to appoint one
additional justice for each sitting justice who had reached the age of
seventy-five without retiring, with such additional appointments limited to one per calendar year. (p. 477). This estimate of support in
the Senate “give or take two or three, matched the confidential tallies
produced by each side.” (p. 474). The “substitute Court bill—galling
as it would no doubt be to the intransigents—might be enough to
end the long impasse.” (p. 477).
Robinson had done it—he had built a majority. There was no guarantee
that he could hold it; but for now, at least, he had the votes to win.
Wheeler, accordingly, stopped boasting or bluffing that he could beat
any compromise. “You know what that means,” Hiram Johnson wrote his
son. It meant a filibuster.

(p. 474).
Earlier in the narrative, Mr. Shesol mentions briefly that on April
1, Hugo Black had warned Roosevelt “that the bill’s opponents were
planning to use parliamentary tricks to delay a vote as long as possible.” (p. 417). And the opposition clearly was employing tactics of
delay in the quasi-filibuster they conducted, with Ashurst’s complicity,
in the Judiciary Committee hearings. In fact, however, plans for a filibuster of the Court bill had begun to take shape even before the
hearings began, and long before the Jefferson Island retreat and the
29
emergence of a compromise bill supported by the President. Sena29
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tor William Borah of Idaho “made plans to filibuster the Court bill to
death if enough Democrats did not defect from Roosevelt. He would
talk about constitutional law and history for a month if necessary.
One of his associates declared many years later that Borah had
planned to fight the Court bill with his voice until he fainted with exhaustion!” Journalists encountered Borah at his Senate desk prepar30
ing a filibuster speech as early as March 4. On March 8, a prominent Republican wrote to William Allen White, “‘unless there is a
change of attitude caused by the tremendous propaganda of the Administration, there are enough senators pledged to speak against the
31
President’s proposal to prevent a vote upon it.’” Senator Arthur
Capper confirmed this view when he wrote to White on February 26:
“I think the Roosevelt program in its present form is blocked. I feel
32
quite certain we have enough votes to upset him.” Not even in their
most optimistic moments did the plan’s proponents believe that they
had the sixty-four votes then necessary under the Senate rules to invoke cloture. It was against this backdrop that Roosevelt had elected
to take his case to the public in early March.
With the introduction of the compromise bill in the Senate in early July, Mr. Shesol reports, a filibuster “now seemed inevitable. Even
before the island retreat, opposition leaders had begun drafting the
interminable speeches with which senators held the floor during a filibuster.” (p. 474). “The opposition had also split its forces into
‘quints,’ teams of five senators that were charged with talking for
twenty-four hours—to be relieved, if necessary, by a ‘reserve squad’ of
experienced filibusterers. ‘I will stand in the Senate until I drop,’
announced Pat McCarran.” (p. 475). “There were other time-worn
tactics to blockade a bill. One Senate rule forbade members from
speaking more than twice per day on a given piece of legislation; but
a senator was free to offer as many amendments to the bill as he
wished, and could then speak twice on each new amendment. This
created a nearly infinite range of possibilities for mischief.” (p. 475).
In early July, Senator Josiah Bailey coached a young team of American Bar Association lawyers in the preparation of amendments to be
used in the filibuster. Within a day they had produced 125 amendments—“enough to permit 250 speeches.” (p. 475).
30
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Robinson knew that he was not yet even close to having the votes
necessary to impose cloture, and he expressed doubt over how long
his support would hold in the face of a filibuster. There were between forty-two and forty-four senators lined up to speak against the
measure. “At no time in the history of successful filibusters,” wrote
William Leuchtenburg, “could the foes of a piece of legislation count
so many Senators in their ranks as were aligned against the Court
33
bill. . . .” About half of these senators had pledged to make two fulldress speeches enduring for up to two days each, not only against the
bill itself, but also twice again on each of Bailey’s 125 amendments.
Had support for the bill not crumbled so quickly, observed Alsop and
Catledge, “[t]he oratory might well have flowed on until the 1938
34
election.”
Still, no one could be sure that the opposition’s filibuster lines
would hold. As Mr. Shesol relates: “Before the Jefferson Island picnic, most of Roosevelt’s Senate supporters had lacked the will to ride
out a filibuster. But after their return, infused with new resolve, they
readied parliamentary maneuvers to break the rebellion. Robinson
and his deputies were confident that as the weeks dragged on and the
heat of the Washington summer grew more and more oppressive, the
opposition would suffer defections.” (p. 475). “At the moment, according to Gallup,” Mr. Shesol reports, “the American people were
just about evenly divided on the question.” (p. 476).
It is important to understand here that the question on which the
American people were nearly evenly divided was whether they supported a filibuster of the substitute bill. The July 5 Gallup poll to
which Mr. Shesol refers showed 49% of those with opinions favoring
35
a filibuster, with 51% opposed. The American people were not,
however, evenly divided on the question of whether they supported
the bill. An unpublished Gallup poll taken between June 9 and June
14 asked: “Would you favor a compromise on the plan (to enlarge
the Supreme Court) which would permit the President to appoint
two new judges instead of six?” 37% said yes, 47% said no, and 16%
36
had no opinion. When asked substantively the same question in early May, 62% of those with opinions had answered No, while 38% had
33
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William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, a Second Death, 1985
DUKE L. J. 673, 682 (1985); BAKER, supra note 3, at 233–34; WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT 150–51 (1995); ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 246, 248.
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 250, 246, 248; BAKER, supra note 3, at 233–35, 239,
246–47.
PUBLIC OPINION, 1935–1946, at 150 (Hadley Cantril, ed., 1951).
Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup, supra note 2, at 72 n. 342 (2002).
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37

answered Yes. Between July 14 and July 19, Gallup asked respondents: “The Senate is now debating a plan which permits the President
to enlarge the Supreme Court by adding one new judge each year.
Do you favor this plan?” Only 36% of those questioned answered Yes,
38
while 50% answered No, and 14% expressed no opinion. All of the
relevant polls showed strong opposition to any substitute measure
that would permit Roosevelt to enlarge the membership of the Court
39
with additional appointments.
Yet Mr. Shesol maintains that “most observers expected that once
the blathering began, the balance would shift decisively against a filibuster. Burt Wheeler and Tom Connally were already feeling heat
back home for their apparent obsession with the Court issue, and before long, most opposition senators were sure to face popular pressure to attend to other, urgent business. Farmers, for example, were
loudly demanding some form of a new AAA, and workers wanted passage of the wages and hours bill. Their patience was not unlimited. . . . By July 3, union members in New York had collected 2,000
signatures on a petition warning Senator Robert Wagner against joining a filibuster. Efforts like this, presumably, were just the beginning.” (pp. 476–77). “Hiram Johnson, a veteran of many filibusters
during his twenty years in the Senate, feared that Robinson was right.
‘I know how men tire,’ Johnson wrote his son, ‘and though these
men,—The Democrats, I mean—have . . . a pertinacity that is admirable. . . , I imagine that one by one they will be broken down.’” (pp.
475–76).
In the end, Johnson was happy to be proved wrong. But even at
the time it was clear that, even were the bill’s Senate proponents successful in breaking the opposition’s filibuster, the bill would still have
to negotiate the House. This meant reckoning with the hostile
House Judiciary Committee and its chairman, Hatton Sumners, who
on July 13 took to the House floor to offer an ominous assessment of
the bill’s probability of ultimate passage. Sumners “denounced the
Court bill as ‘a meat ax’ that would wreck ‘Anglo-Saxon institutions,’
and—to the wild applause of his colleagues—pledged that, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, he would never let it pass the
House.” (p. 488). “[I]f they bring that bill into this House for consideration,” Sumners predicted, “I do not believe they will have

37
38
39

21% expressed no opinion. GEORGE GALLUP & SAUL FORBES RAE, THE PULSE OF
DEMOCRACY: THE PUBLIC-OPINION POLL AND HOW IT WORKS 304 (1940).
Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup, supra note 2, at 72.
Id. at 71–72.
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enough hide left on it to bother about.” This confirmed Vice President Garner’s long-held view that the bill could not pass the House.
“Sumners would bottle the bill up in his Judiciary Committee, and
the House members did not appear very anxious to dislodge the bill
41
from his grasp.” As Lionel Patenaude argued in 1970, “Sumners’
42
opposition was probably enough to insure [the bill’s] defeat.” James
MacGregor Burns similarly concluded,
That the court bill probably never had a chance of passing seems
now quite clear. Roosevelt’s original proposal evidently never commanded a majority in the Senate. In the House it would have run up
against the unyielding Sumners, and then against a conservative Rules
Committee capable of blocking the bill for weeks. From the start Democratic leaders in the House were worried about the bill’s prospects in that
chamber. Robinson’s compromise plan might have gone through the
Senate if he had lived. More likely, though, it would have failed in the
43
face of a dogged Senate filibuster, or later in the House.

As it would happen, the bill would never make it to the House.
Robinson introduced the substitute bill in the Senate on July 2. “The
fight was his now,” in Mr. Shesol’s assessment, “and it was a fight that
most expected him to win.” (p. 478). The floor debate began on July
6. Fully prepared for a filibuster, “Robinson dared his opponents to
try to outlast him.” (p. 482). Wheeler responded that he was “‘in
very good physical condition,’” because he had “‘been training for
it.’” Wheeler assured his colleagues that he was not threatening a filibuster, though he did think that it would take “‘considerable time to
discuss’” the bill. Robinson retorted that he did not intend to interfere with the freedom of debate, “‘but I think I will know when you
turn from a debater into a filibusterer, and then, as the old saying
goes, it will be ‘dog eat dog.’’” (p. 482).
In fact, as Mr. Shesol observes, Robinson quickly fired a preemptive strike against the anticipated filibuster. The majority leader
elected “to invoke a long-ignored rule preventing senators from yielding the floor to one another for statements (as opposed to questions)
and limiting each senator to two speeches a day on a given subject.”
(p. 483). But now Robinson “defined ‘day’ to mean not a calendar
day—which of course lasted twenty-four hours—but a ‘legislative’ day,
which could go on indefinitely. During a tariff debate in 1922, one
legislative day lasted 105 calendar days. But that was the last time an40
41
42
43

ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 264–65; BAKER, supra note 3, at 243.
BAKER, supra note 3, at 218.
Lionel V. Patenaude, Garner, Sumners, and Connally: The Defeat of the Roosevelt Court Bill in
1937, 74 SW. HIST. Q. 36, 51 (1970).
BURNS, supra note 15, at 314.
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yone could remember the rules being applied so strictly.” This provoked a “good deal of . . . bitterness” among Robinson’s Senate colleagues. “Robinson, noted Time, was breaking ‘the great unwritten
rule of the Senate: that its written rules are not rigidly enforced. . . . This was far closer to steamroller tactics than the U.S.
Senate usually sees. Many of the elder members . . . fumed with anger at the breach.’ Discussion of the bill nearly came to a stop as senators bickered about the rules. Order collapsed; confusion reigned;
the line between a question and a statement was inherently blurry,
and over those two days, Pittman had to rebuke his colleagues dozens
of times for breaking the rules.” (p. 483).
Perhaps as a result of Robinson’s overreaching, it would not take
long for the opposition to turn the tide. “During the first few days of
the debate,” Mr. Shesol reports, “the opposition did not send its own
speakers to the floor. Preserving their strength for the long siege,
they contented themselves at first with mocking, harassing, and relentlessly interrupting supporters of the bill. Then, on Friday, July 9,
Burt Wheeler rose—and spoke without cease for the next three
hours.” (p. 485). Members of the opposition held the floor Friday,
Saturday, and again on Monday. (pp. 485–86). And they “were gaining ground.” (p. 486). Robinson left the floor during Senator Josiah
Bailey’s speech and placed a phone call to Joseph Keenan of the
White House strategy board. “‘I tell you I’m worried,’ Robinson said.
A headcount on July 10 showed some attrition: Roosevelt’s 54-vote
majority was now down to 51 or, at best, 52; two days later, it fell to
50.” As Arthur Krock observed, “‘all the morale seems to be on one
side.’” (p. 486). On July 13, only a week into the debate, “Robinson
ushered about thirty senators into his office. The opposition, he
complained, was ‘cutting to pieces the president’s bill.’” (p. 488).
Robinson would be found dead in his apartment the next morning. It is sometimes thought that the substitute bill would have
passed the Senate but for the majority leader’s untimely demise. But
Mr. Shesol’s astute account casts grave doubt on that assessment. For
he notes that it was on the preceding day, July 13, as Robinson was
resting at home in bed, that “Key Pittman defied his direct orders and
decreed, from the chair, that every new amendment constituted a
new subject, allowing each senator to speak twice on it—thus permitting opposition senators to speak without cease.” (p. 488). With
Robinson temporarily absent from the chamber, Pittman thus refused to play hardball, capitulated to the pressure to observe customary norms of senatorial civility, and thereby facilitated the conduct of
the opposition filibuster. Moreover, Mr. Shesol points out: “Robinson was in bed as his lieutenants wrung their hands and worried that
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if they failed to stop the debate, the party would be torn asunder, irreparably so. He was in bed as four senators—three of whom Robinson had counted as likely supporters of the bill—let it be known they
would not only vote against it but would go to the White House and
urge FDR to abandon the fight.” (p. 488). Support for the bill was
44
already collapsing even before Robinson had passed from this life.
When the majority leader’s body was discovered the following
morning, Tommy Corcoran warned FDR’s secretary Missy LeHand
“to prepare the president for a battery of calls telling him to drop the
Court bill. Indeed, within fifteen minutes, Bernard Baruch, the wellknown financier and friend of Robinson, was on the line, urging
Roosevelt to quit the fight and avoid killing any more senators.” (p.
489). “[I]nevitably,” Mr. Shesol concludes, “most observers saw Robinson’s death as a final, fitting, damning verdict on Roosevelt’s plan.
‘Had it not been for the Court bill,’ Burt Wheeler charged, Robinson
‘would be alive today. I beseech the President to drop the fight lest
he appear to fight against God.’” (p. 490). “Newspapers predicted
that Roosevelt would abandon the fight and use this moment of
shared grief as an opportunity to heal the breach in his party.” But
“FDR’s instinct was exactly the opposite. He resolved to press ahead,
harder than before. . . . His entire presidency seemed to hang in the
balance.” (p. 490). White House spokesmen “insisted that the president was not backing down.” (p. 491). On the morning of July 15,
when four freshman senators visited Roosevelt and “pleaded with him
to stop tearing the party apart,” the President was unmoved. “‘Mr.
President,’ one of them mustered the courage to say, ‘it’s the hardest
thing in the world to tell you something you don’t want to hear.’
With that, the senators reiterated their intention to go against him on
the bill, and returned to the Capitol.” That same day, “opposition
leaders announced that they had the votes to send back (or, in Senate parlance, ‘recommit’) the bill to the Judiciary Committee, a move
that was the legislative equivalent of euthanasia . . . .” (p. 491). The
rest was denouement. “‘All that remains to be done,’ one senator
said, ‘is to call the coroner.’” (p. 496).
Mr. Shesol’s skillful rendering of the political story thus lends
support to the view that—though there was of course some uncertainty—contemporary observers, including the justices of the Su44

See SHOGAN, supra note 12, at 215 (“Even had [Robinson] lived, the chances of success for
the truncated version of FDR’s play were dubious. Opposition in the Senate showed no
sign of melting away. And even if Robinson could prevent a filibuster and gain a majority, a hostile reception awaited the measure in the House, where Hatton Summers [sic]
would lead the welcoming committee.”).

210

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:1

preme Court, had good reason to doubt that the President’s bill ever
would become law. It was apparent throughout the fight that, due in
part to his promise to Robinson, the President would cling stubbornly
to his own bill rather than seizing on any of a number of possible
compromise measures. And it was doubtful that even a compromise
measure could survive both a Senate filibuster and the House Judiciary and Rules Committees. It was not unreasonable for the justices to
doubt that their immediate, total, and unconditional surrender was
necessary in order to avert the threat of Court-packing.
Mr. Shesol attributes Roosevelt’s political miscalculations in the
Court-packing debacle to “overconfidence” and “hubris.” (p. 509).
“Without question, Roosevelt acted imperiously, compounding his
crucial, initial failure to consult congressional leaders by refusing to
heed them for months thereafter, and treating them instead with a
loose contempt. ‘It took him an unconscionable time to discover his
weakness,’ Tugwell reflected. ‘This must be charged mostly to overconfidence.’” (p. 509). This overconfidence was attributable in turn
to the tremendous margin by which the President was returned to office by the voters the preceding November. In 1937 FDR mistakenly
persisted in the belief that “‘the voters are with us today just as they
were last fall.’” (p. 509). “Before the landslide, his self-confidence
had usually (if not always) been tempered by his eagerness for consensus and conciliation; by his ability to remain a bit detached from
his own decisions, in case he might need to alter or abandon them;
and by his willingness to ‘force himself,’ as Frances Perkins had long
observed, ‘to face the most dreary and discouraging facts.’ These
strengths of Roosevelt’s—so badly needed in 1937—went into eclipse.
Confidence gave way to overconfidence, boldness to recklessness, urgency to impatience, tolerance to vengefulness, persuasion to coercion.” (p. 508).
It often has been argued that the Supreme Court’s landmark constitutional decisions handed down in the spring of 1937 were influenced significantly by the results of the 1936 election. Mr. Shesol’s
rich account invites us to consider whether the deeper and more fateful impact of that election may instead have been on the thought of
the President himself.
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II. THE LEGAL STORY
A. The Historiographical Posture
I now turn to the second and third questions that any account of
the Court-packing struggle must address, namely, how does one best
tell the legal story, and how does one best understand the relationship between the political story and the legal story? Scholars have offered a variety of answers to these questions, but they can be roughly
grouped into what I will call externalist and internalist accounts. (I
should confess here that I would be considered an internalist.) Externalists tend to see a rather sharp break in constitutional doctrine
in the spring of 1937, and attribute that sudden change to the influence of exogenous factors such as the threat of the Court-packing
Plan or the impression made on the justices by FDR’s landslide reelection in 1936. Internalists tend to see the change in constitutional
doctrine as more gradual and spread out over a longer period of
time, and to emphasize the importance of presidential appointments
to the Court in pushing doctrinal development along or in new directions. They attribute the greater success of later New Deal initiatives
before the Court to legal factors such as improved constitutional conceptualization at the stages of legislative drafting, test case selection,
and briefing and argument. Externalists tend to see the constitutional doctrine of the period as more open-textured, and to attribute the
selection among available doctrines (and thus case outcomes) to the
political, economic, and social preferences or ideological commitments of the justices. Internalists tend to see evidence and patterns
of judicial performance that are incompatible with such an account,
and instead to see the justices as experiencing constitutional doctrine
as an independent constraint on their extra-legal preferences. Externalists tend to see the justices as the moving parts in the story—
that the relevant changes are those in their positions. Internalists
tend by contrast to emphasize adaptations by Congress and Administration lawyers—made in light of the Court’s decisions invalidating
portions of the First New Deal—that enabled them to accommodate
their regulatory objectives within the Court’s evolving body of doctrine. I want to underscore that these are questions of emphasis. Externalists do not deny that legal ideas sometimes operated as constraints on judicial behavior; internalists do not deny that particular
facts and developments in the broader world were sometimes relevant to constitutional adjudication. The disputed terrain is over
which factors were relevant, how much constraint and how much in-
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fluence each of these factors brought to bear on the justices, and the
relationships among those factors.
Mr. Shesol’s account draws uneasily on both of these types of accounts. At several points he is attentive to the legal, or “internal” dimensions of the story. For instance, he notes that the drafting of
statutes with insufficient attention paid to questions of constitutionality “was all too typical of the early New Deal.” (p. 43). In a chapter
appropriately entitled “Shortcuts,” Mr. Shesol recognizes that: “In
shaping the recovery program, the Constitution was a concern—but
not an overriding one. Far more pressing was the question of how
quickly a given bill could be drafted, passed, and made effective. The
first phase of the New Deal unfolded not in an orderly procession of
new laws but in a rush—a scramble.” (p. 42). He reports that Attorney General Homer Cummings admitted that he “‘went about with
my pockets bulging with half-baked proclamations and undigested
legislation, all requiring attention, study, and reformulation.’” (p.
43). But the press of time required “immediate,” “rapid-fire opinions,” with the result that “‘I probably made some mistakes.’” (p. 43).
The Agricultural Adjustment Act (“AAA”), which “stood on shaky
constitutional ground,” (p. 174), was drafted “in haste, without any
serious consideration of its constitutionality, despite its novel tax provisions.” (p. 43). Similarly, the National Recovery Administration
(“NRA”) was “in effect, a grand constitutional gamble.” (p. 43). NRA
administrator Hugh Johnson doubted that the statute was constitutional (pp. 55–56), as did some of the best legal minds in the Administration. As Mr. Shesol points out, the NRA’s delegation of authority
to the president “was unprecedented. It was also unconstitutional—
at least in the view of Charles Wyzanski, a young Labor Department
lawyer who had helped draft the bill. Wyzanski wrote his mentor Felix Frankfurter that the president’s codemaking authority went ‘so far
beyond the bounds of constitutionality that it would be useless’ to defend it in court. He further feared the Recovery Act exceeded the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Jerome Frank,
another Frankfurter man in the administration, found it ‘shocking’
that not a single constitutional lawyer had been asked to review the
codemaking apparatus. The bill, Frank said, could have been squared
with well-established constitutional doctrine, but no one had bothered.” (p. 44). Frankfurter raised these concerns with FDR, but they
45
were “brushed aside in the hurry to enact the bill.” (p. 44).
45

Similarly, when currency devaluation legislation was being prepared, “no one asked the
Justice Department for an opinion.” Cummings offered one anyway, suggesting some re-
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Similarly, Mr. Shesol notes that Homer Cummings wrote to FDR
in June of 1935 that the Guffey Coal Act was “‘clearly unconstitutional,’” and that the amendments to the AAA “‘were not in good condition to meet the constitutional test,’” and “‘would have to be
strengthened to give them any chance at all.’” (p. 153). Indeed,
Cummings avoided giving Congress an opinion on the Guffey Coal
bill because he believed it was unconstitutional, and FDR had to pry
the bill out of subcommittee, asking its members to overcome their
constitutional doubts and report the bill out. (p. 166). While lamenting the “sloppiness” associated with the NRA, and the “slapdash
affair of the Hundred Days,” Mr. Shesol praises the “increasing care
in the drafting of legislation” that characterized the later New Deal.
(p. 167).
Mr. Shesol lays a good bit of the blame for this inattention to
questions of constitutionality on the President himself, whom Mr.
Shesol paints as less than a first-rate lawyer. Roosevelt thought about
things in terms of right and wrong rather than legal and illegal, and
believed that if an idea were actuated by good motives then it could
not be unconstitutional. He was, Mr. Shesol reports, impatient with
“legalistic reasoning.” (p. 46). But Mr. Shesol also highlights the
weakness of the legal staff in the Justice Department, which became a
haven of patronage. (p. 54). One of the principal ways in which that
weakness was manifested was in the poor job the Department did in
cultivating promising cases through which to test the constitutional
validity of various New Deal measures. (pp. 54–55). The impulse to
delay testing the NRA before the Supreme Court resulted in the Government’s request in March of 1935 that the appeal of United States v.
Belcher—46a case involving the constitutionality of the NRA’s Lumber
Code—be voluntarily dismissed. Mr. Shesol recounts how this decision left the Administration stuck with defending the NRA in the
context of the preposterous “Sick Chicken Case” of United States v.
Schechter Poultry Corp.,47 (pp. 129–33) which NRA acting general coun48
sel Blackwell Smith regarded as “the weakest possible case.” “[A]s
the Belcher debacle had shown, the government’s failure to seek the
right sort of test cases meant that it had to choose from the cases at

46
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48

visions to bring the measure into compliance with existing precedent, but his changes
were never made. SHESOL, supra note 2, at 43.
294 U.S. 736 (1935).
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 85 (1982); THOMAS I. EMERSON, YOUNG LAWYER
FOR THE NEW DEAL: AN INSIDER’S MEMOIR OF THE ROOSEVELT YEARS 25 (Joan P. Emerson
ed., 1991).
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hand. Now there was really only one option left. It was in this way
that the fate of the NRA came to rest on a kosher poultry plant in
Brooklyn.” (p. 131). Mr. Shesol is also critical of what he characterizes as Stanley Reed’s rather weak performance in the argument over
the constitutionality of the AAA in United States v. Butler.49 Reed
“hedged, contradicted, and ultimately disowned the grander claims”
made in the government’s brief. (p. 178). He “was no match for” his
adversary, George Wharton Pepper. (p. 178).
Mr. Shesol is also alert to the fact that decisions in 1935 and 1936
invalidating various early New Deal measures did not doom later statutes prepared with greater care. For instance, even after the Court
invalidated the Railway Pension Act in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton50 in the spring of 1935, Roosevelt and others believed that the Social Security Act was “safe because lawmakers, with the Court very
much in mind, had rested the bill on the government’s taxing power
51
rather than the commerce power.” (p. 119). He astutely notes that
Justice Sutherland’s holding in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.52 that the
Guffey Coal Act’s price-fixing provisions were not severable from its
unconstitutional labor provisions made it unnecessary to address the
constitutionality of the price-fixing provisions directly. “This nimble
act of avoidance kept Roberts on board—for it was Roberts who, in
Nebbia, had upheld the power of Congress to do exactly what it had
53
done in the Guffey Act, that is, to regulate prices.” (p. 213). It was
for this reason that even after the decision Homer Cummings “was
feeling fine, for he perceived ‘a small crack in the door’: Sutherland’s avoidance of the price-fixing issue. To Cummings this suggested that not only Hughes but also Roberts might join the liberals in
sustaining price controls in the future, should Congress revive that

49
50
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297 U.S. 1 (1936).
295 U.S. 330 (1935).
It is not clear, however, that Mr. Shesol recognizes that Alton left open the possibility of a
national railway pension system grounded in the taxing power. See SHESOL, supra note 2,
at 118 (“Ultimately, the act ran aground on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Had Roberts left it at that—had he disposed of the case on the narrowest terms
possible, in keeping with the Court’s unwritten rule of self-restraint—Congress might
have been able to comply with the decision by revising the law. Yet Roberts went further,
rejecting the very idea of a relationship between retirement security and interstate commerce—in any industry. He had issued, in effect, a preemptive veto of similar legislation.”). In fact, the taxing power alternative was quickly recognized and enacted by Congress. See Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation, 1998 J. SUP.
CT. HIST. 79, 88–91, 104–09 (1998).
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
The reference is to Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), in which Justice Roberts had
written the opinion for a 5-4 majority upholding legislative regulation of milk prices.
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half of the Guffey Act.” (p. 214). Indeed, Cummings disagreed with
the suggestion of FDR aide Stanley High that “the New Deal had
been so badly damaged by the Court that in the course of the [1936]
campaign, FDR would have to say what he planned to do about it.”
Cummings “took a more sanguine view. The only real casualty . . .
was the NRA. The AAA was being reenacted by other means; Guffey
could be, too; the [Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”)] and [the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)] had, at least for now,
survived; the administration had prevailed in the gold clause cases;
and the government’s spending power, Cummings added, had gone
essentially unchallenged.” (pp. 214–15).
Yet these instances of sensitivity to the internal point of view are
diluted, if not negated, by a countervailing insistence on viewing the
performance of the Court and its justices through the lenses of the
Progressive paradigm and the attitudinal model. Mr. Shesol repeatedly employs political taxonomy in characterizing the justices. In his
view the Court was comprised of “two wings,” a liberal one and a conservative one, with Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice
Owen Roberts in the middle. (pp. 31–32). “[S]talwart conservatives
such as George Sutherland,” Willis Van Devanter, James Clark
McReynolds, and Pierce Butler “contended that the judge’s role was
not to defer to the legislature but to stand ‘as a shield’ for ‘the individual against the unjust demands of society,’ even if that meant ‘disregard[ing] the wishes and sentiments of a majority of the people.’”
(p. 31). Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, and later Harlan Fiske Stone and Benjamin Cardozo, by contrast, are depicted as
the liberal heroes who stood up against the conservatives’ abuse of
the Due Process Clause to prevent social experimentation by demo54
cratic majorities. On this account, majorities to sustain or invalidate
legislation challenged before the Court were formed owing to the
movement of Hughes and/or Roberts from left to right, from liberalism to conservatism. “Hughes found himself caught in the middle,
tacking left and then shifting right, trying to achieve a balance between the Court’s liberals, who largely shared Roosevelt’s idea of a

54

Mr. Shesol appears to believe that Justice John Marshall Harlan was of the same mind as
Holmes and Brandeis on these issues, based on Harlan’s dissent in Lochner, though he is
apparently unaware of Harlan’s majority opinion in Adair v. United States invalidating the
Erdman Act’s protection’s against anti-union discrimination on liberty of contract
grounds. SHESOL, supra note 2, at 31. To his credit, Mr. Shesol does recognize that Stone
didn’t like to be thought of as a New Dealer, and was uncomfortable with liberal praise of
his Butler dissent. Id. at 192.
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‘living’ Constitution, and the Court’s conservatives, who staunchly,
bitterly rejected it.” (p. 5).
The language of movement permeates Mr. Shesol’s account, and
the moving parts are not increased attention to constitutional detail
by legislative draftsmen or the cultivation of promising test cases by
government lawyers. The moving parts are the Justices themselves.
Hughes and Roberts are repeatedly depicted as moving back and
forth between the competing camps, tacking left and then
“drift[ing]” or “return[ing] to the right.” (pp. 5, 125, 432, 519, 528).
Hughes had been liberal in his days as an Associate Justice in the second decade of the twentieth century, but by the time he was nominated to serve as Chief Justice in 1930, “Hughes’ liberalism seemed
consigned to the distant past.” (p. 27). In 1930 and 1931, “liberalism” prevailed on the Court, and then in 1932 the “pendulum swung
back” to “conservatism”—this because Hughes and Roberts had been
liberal in 1930 and 1931, and then suddenly became conservative in
1932. (p. 32–33). Those who have read Drew Pearson and Robert S.
Allen’s 1936 bestseller, The Nine Old Men, will recognize this portrayal
of Hughes. In the chapter on the Chief Justice, Pearson and Allen
charged Hughes with swinging back and forth between the liberal
and conservative camps in an unpredictable and unprincipled fash55
ion. The title of the chapter was, “The Man on the Flying Trapeze.”
Mr. Shesol’s assessment of Roberts similarly echoes the charge
that the Justice conducted “an ultimately unsuccessful search for a
56
coherent judicial philosophy.”
Roberts, we are told, “emitted
enough mixed signals during his first years on the Court to keep parties guessing which way he really leaned. Then Nebbia, as far as most
of the press were concerned, settled the matter: Roberts, it was clear,
was a liberal.” (p. 125). But with Roberts’ opinion in Alton the following year, it “now seemed beyond dispute” that he had “‘definitely
aligned himself’ with the conservatives.” (p. 125). “Roberts, a former
railroad lawyer, sounded at times as if he were arguing the case as
counsel for the carriers, not deciding it as an impartial judge.” (p.
117). “Owen Roberts, at long last, had revealed himself . . . . He had
taken off his coat, put on his judicial robes, and was rooting for good,
old-fashioned, Anglo-Saxon individualism.” (pp. 125–26).

55
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DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 74–97 (1936).
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND
VINSON, 1941–1953, at 15 (1997); see also Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s),
108 YALE L.J. 2165, 2188 (1999) (“In my heart, I still believe the Roberts of 1937 had undergone a jurisprudential lobotomy . . . .”).
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As this assessment of Roberts suggests, for Mr. Shesol, being a liberal or a conservative justice boiled down to selecting between two
competing theories of political economy in the service of two competing sets of interests. The competing theories were those of “laissezfaire and the emerging welfare state,” and the question was whether
the Court would embrace “the idea that law could be a tool to remedy, rather than perpetuate, the harshest realities of American life,” or
instead show “suspicion” of “economic regulations.” (p. 33). The interests were those of railroads and other large corporations versus
everyone else. Mr. Shesol’s account of the rise of substantive due
process in the Supreme Court, for example, is a model of unreconstructed Progressive historiography. In contrast with the views articu57
lated in nearly four decades of revisionist work on the topic, Mr.

57

See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 156,
160 (1993) (discussing the Court’s efforts to limit legislative redistribution through the
requirement that laws be “universal” or “neutral” in their application); WILLIAM FORBATH,
LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 8–9 (1991) (exploring ways in
which judicial review of labor regulation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries conditioned the strategies of labor movements, and the ways in which the strategies
of labor movements, in turn, influenced the judiciary); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1993) (examining the influence of the principle of neutrality on the
Lochner Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 19–
31 (1992) (analyzing Lochner and pre-Lochner police powers decisions in light of the nineteenth century liberal conception of “the neutral state”); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era
Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92
GEO. L.J. 1 (2003); Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 881 (2005); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 771–72 (1985) (arguing that the development of constitutional labor regulation during the Gilded Age was the product of competing visions of
republicanism); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L.
REV. 493 (1997); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 298, 304–31
(1985) (contending that the Supreme Court’s development of laissez-faire constitutionalism should be understood, in part, as an effort to protect traditional notions of liberty);
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878–89 (1987) (discussing the
legacy of the Lochner Court’s view of “neutrality” as a condition set by the common law);
Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some
Parameters of Laissez-faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 971–73 (1975)
(discussing Justice Field’s attempts to formulate “immutable rules” to distinguish between
regulation and confiscation when examining the limits of states’ police powers); Aviam
Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme
Court, 1888–1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 252, 278 (1987) (examining the relationship
between paternalism—“encouraging and applying some form of protection while excoriating and invalidating others”—and redistribution in the period’s constitutionalism);
Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy Over Railroad
and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 189–92 (1984) (discussing the distinction
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Shesol argues that at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted in 1868, “the due process clause struck Congress and the
Courts as unambiguous. The word ‘process’ made plain its concern
with the procedures by which a government acted: how laws were
enacted, how fairly they were enforced. . . . It was not long, however,
before railroad lawyers, monopolists, and conservative thinkers like
Thomas M. Cooley, a prominent Michigan judge and law professor,
were arguing—before increasingly receptive state and federal judges—that the guarantee of due process shielded individuals and corporations against the legislative restrictions of property rights. Reflecting this influence and the sympathies of the elites, which were
solidly behind the railroads and other new and massive corporations,
courts in the 1880s began to scrutinize the substance of legislation,
especially in the economic realm.” (p. 30). By “the 1920s, and with
increasing vehemence over the latter half of the decade, the Supreme
Court had defended the interests of corporations, the rights of property, and ‘liberty of contract’ against encroachments by government . . . . Chief Justice William Howard Taft and his conservative
brethren—imbued with a sense that they were saving civilization from
Bolsheviks, collectivists, and other sundry radicals —voided state and
federal legislation at a record rate. In what the dean of the Harvard
Law School called a ‘carnival of unconstitutionality,’ the Court erased
more laws from the books between 1921 and 1930 than it had in the
first hundred years of its existence.” (p. 24).
Consulting the sources on which Mr. Shesol relies for these claims
about the rate of invalidation by the Taft Court reveals them to be
potentially misleading. One of those sources, the first edition of David O’Brien’s Storm Center, shows that the Taft Court overturned
twelve congressional statutes between 1921 and 1930. The White
Court had overturned twelve between 1910 and 1921; the Fuller
Court had overturned fourteen between 1889 and 1910; the Waite
Court had overturned nine between 1874 and 1888; the Chase Court
had overturned ten between 1865 and 1873. The Taft Court did
overturn more state statutes than any of its predecessors, at 131; but
the White Court had invalidated 107 and the Fuller Court had struck
down 73. In all the Taft Court invalidated 155 federal, state, and
municipal laws; the White Court struck down 137; the Fuller Court
struck down 102. It is true that under Taft the Court “erased more

between privilege and property in the context of reactions to the changing economic environment of the early twentieth century).
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laws from the books between 1921 and 1930 than it had in the first
hundred years of its existence”; but so had the White Court and
58
Fuller Courts before them.
The valence of Mr. Shesol’s characterizations of these positions
and the Justices who held them leaves no doubt which is to be preferred. He repeatedly opines unfavorably on the “stridency” (p. 2) of
“conservative” opinions invalidating economic regulations. (The
“liberal” justices, by contrast, are never “strident”—not even Stone in
his biting Butler dissent.) Roberts’ opinion in late 1935 invalidating a
federal tax on liquor dealers, for example, was characterized by a
“stridency” and “angry insistence” that were “startling.” (p. 178). But
his opinion in Alton, where his voice was “heavy with sarcasm,” was
“his most strident.” (pp. 117–18). His “wanton, almost defiant disregard of the realities faced by railroad workers” was “extreme.” (p.
119) Similarly “extreme,” even “noxious,” was the Court’s 1923 decision invalidating a minimum wage law for women in the District of
Columbia. (p. 219). The Court’s “doctrinaire” (p. 432) “conservatives” were so objectionable that even their approval of the gold
clause policy and the TVA were only “grudging.” (p. 221).
But one is left wondering why the Justices would have upheld any
act they did not really want to, grudgingly or otherwise. For on this
account, the Justices did not experience legal doctrine as a constraint
on their range of action; instead, legal doctrine was a “tool” or a
“weapon” serving ulterior ends. The Due Process Clause was a
“weapon” wielded in “internecine wars” among the Justices. (pp. 29–
30). “Judges had other tools to safeguard property rights, among
them the contracts and commerce clauses of Article I of the Constitution and the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. . . . The spear
was the Constitution’s, but the battle was the Lord’s: as radical and
reform movements sprang up to combat the injustices of the industrial era, conservative judges saw themselves as fighting a holy war
against what the historian Charles Beard called the ‘oncoming hosts
of communism and anarchy.’ The liberties they defended were, in
the admiring words of the English jurist Henry Maine, a ‘bulwark of
American individualism against democratic impatience and socialistic
fantasy.’” (pp. 30–31). So, in the late nineteenth century legal “formalism” was revived, “conjoined with doctrines of more recent vin58

DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 43 (1st
ed., 1986). Felix Frankfurter’s 1930 claim that “[s]ince 1920, the Court has invalidated
more legislation that in fifty years preceding,” cited in the other source relied upon by
Mr. Shesol, namely, ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO
BURGER 70 (1979), therefore appears to be wildly inaccurate.
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tage (such as substantive due process) and put to use in nullifying the
income tax, overturning a ban on child labor, narrowing the scope of
the antitrust laws, and more. The defenders of the Constitution-asmechanism had, as a rule, a greater stake in the established economic
order, and, not coincidentally, in judicial doctrines that perpetuated
it. One’s choice of metaphor said much about one’s politics.” (p.
47). And in 1935 and 1936, “the majority’s solicitude for states’ rights
had seemed to depend less on precedent than on which rights, in
particular, a state tried to exercise.” (p. 219).
This conception of the judicial function suffuses Mr. Shesol’s portraits of two of the “conservative brethren,” Van Devanter and Sutherland. Van Devanter, we learn, “did little to curb” the impression that
he “was beholden to the railroads.” (p. 39). “Van Devanter’s vote was
rarely in doubt: he ‘lined up always with the conservatives and voted
almost always in favor of big business . . . .’” (p. 39). Similarly, Mr.
59
Shesol maintains that Sutherland’s dissent in Blaisdell, in which a 5-4
majority upheld Minnesota’s mortgage moratorium, was inspired by
“the enduring influence of Herbert Spencer. . . .‘Survival of the fittest’ . . . served as a mission statement not only for laissez-faire capitalism and indifferent government, but also for the constitutional doctrines that made America safe for liberty, property, and ‘rugged’
individualism.” (pp. 68–69). Mr. Shesol continues, “Sutherland and
the Court’s conservatives believed, throughout their long lives, in
what Spencer called the ‘mercy of severity.’ As Spencer wrote in Social Statics . . . : ‘The forces at work exterminate such sections of
mankind as stand in the way, with the same sternness that they exterminate beasts of prey and herds of useless ruminants.’ This process of ‘purification’ could not—and must not—be impeded by the
state. ‘The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly,
Spencer said, ‘is to fill the world with fools.’ Or, as he elaborated in
Social Statics,
Pervading all Nature we may see at work a stern discipline, which is a little cruel that it may be very kind. . . . The poverty of the incapable, the
distresses that come upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle, and
those shoulderings aside of the weak by the strong, which leave so many
“in shallows and miseries,” are the decrees of a large, far-seeing benevolence. . . . The process must be undergone, and the sufferings must be
endured. No power on Earth, no cunningly-devised laws of statesmen,
no world-rectifying schemes of the humane, no communist panaceas, no
reforms that men ever did broach or ever will broach, can diminish them
one jot. (p. 69).

59

Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448–83 (1934).
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“George Sutherland, more than three quarters of a century later, saw
the Depression . . . and, it was safe to assume, the entire New Deal—
60
through this same prism.” (p. 69).
It will come as no surprise that, in constructing this grotesque caricature of Sutherland, Mr. Shesol relies heavily and selectively upon
two monographs published more than sixty years ago, well before
scholarly reassessments of the Lochner-Era Court began to revise the
work of the Progressive historians: Benjamin Twiss’s Lawyers and the
Constitution: How Laissez-Faire Came to the Supreme Court (1942) and Joel Paschal’s Mr. Justice Sutherland: A Man Against the State (1951). The
more recent, sympathetic, and accurate treatments of legal scholars
61
such as Samuel Olken are overlooked. The reader of Mr. Shesol’s
claims therefore would be shocked to learn that during Sutherland’s
pre-judicial career as a state legislator and United States Senator he
supported legislation mandating the eight-hour workday, the Employers’ Liability Act, the Pure Food and Drugs Act, the Hepburn
Rate Bill, the Children’s Bureau, the Seaman’s Act of 1915, Postal
Savings Banks, free coinage of silver, and the 1896 presidential can62
didacy of populist William Jennings Bryan. The reader would similarly be surprised to learn of the literally hundreds of cases in which
Van Devanter and Sutherland voted to uphold various forms of regulation or taxation of a wide variety of businesses, large and small.
Moreover, the reader would have no inkling that the reason that
Cummings could report in 1936 that the government’s spending
power had gone essentially unchallenged was that in 1923 George
Sutherland, in an opinion joined by each of the Four Horsemen, had
held that federal appropriations from general revenue were not sub63
ject to judicial review. Even though Mr. Shesol never comes to grips
with this enormous body of decisional law, his account is embarrassed
by New Deal cases that he does discuss. The fact that Sutherland and
60

61

62
63

Here again, Mr. Shesol’s account of the wellsprings of judicial behavior is confused. He
later contends that Hughes “was less willing than some of his brethren to adhere blindly
to legal precedent without regard to human welfare,” SHESOL, supra note 2, at 521, but
his portrayals of the Court’s conservatives would suggest that their decisions were driven
less by blind adherence to precedent than by their own attitudes regarding human welfare.
See, e.g., Samuel R. Olken, Justice Sutherland Reconsidered, 62 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2009);
Samuel R. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty: Constitutional Conservatism
and the Problem of Factions, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1997).
JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 36, 56, 63
(1951).
See Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 561–71, 586–
639 (1997). The 1923 opinion referred to in the text is Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923).
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Van Devanter (along with Butler) joined the majority rejecting a challenge to the Tennessee Valley Authority is a “surprise.” (p. 210).
Similarly embarrassing are the votes of Van Devanter and Sutherland
to uphold the old-age pension provision of the Social Security Act in
Helvering v. Davis.64 Mr. Shesol attempts to explain this by arguing
that Justice Cardozo “rooted his pensions decision so deeply in the
reasoning of [Justice Roberts’ opinion invalidating the AAA in Butler]
that even Sutherland and Van Devanter felt compelled to come
aboard.” (p. 454). Mr. Shesol cites no evidence in support of this
explanation for why these two Justices voted as they did in Helvering,
and so far as I am aware, there is none. The claim is bare assertion.
He does not attempt to explain why Justices McReynolds and Butler,
who also joined Roberts’ opinion in Butler, did not similarly feel
compelled to join Cardozo’s opinion in Helvering. But the claim that
these Justices could feel “compelled” to vote in a particular way by a
proposition (arguably obiter dictum) articulated in an earlier decision rests uneasily next to an account that frequently portrays Justices
as agents freely wielding legal doctrines as “tools” and “weapons” in
65
the service of their own ideological and class ends.
So despite his periodic attention to the internal, legal dimensions
of the New Deal’s constitutional saga, Mr. Shesol seems ultimately to
be impatient with them, thinking that they mattered rather little, and
that a focus on them will hinder rather than aid true understanding.
As he puts it in what appears to be an unguarded moment, with the
Court’s decision invalidating New York’s minimum wage law in June
of 1936, “the issue had finally transcended the New Deal. The question confronting the nation—whether government at any level had
any power to address the most vicious inequities of modern life—
could no longer be clouded by nonsense about sick chickens . . . ; it
could no longer be tangled up in the labyrinthine twists of the
‘stream’ of commerce or obscured by legal language.” (p. 222). The
question, on this view, was simply whether the Justices supported laissez-faire or the emerging welfare state—whether the Court would
embrace “the idea that law could be a tool to remedy, rather than

64
65

301 U.S. 619 (1937).
At the same time Mr. Shesol seems to think that Roberts’ vote to uphold the Social Security Act was significantly influenced by the fact that Robert Jackson “‘stressed the arguments that would appeal to conservatives,’” such as “that Social Security promoted thrift
and benefited ‘the man who works.’” SHESOL, supra note 2, at 453. That argument may
hold considerable appeal, but it is not a legal argument, and the claim that it played a
significant role in securing Roberts’ approval suggests again that law actually had little to
do with the case outcome.
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perpetuate, the harshest realities of American life.” (p. 33).
that was not at all the way that the Justices saw the matter.

But

B. Troubles With Doctrine
It is perhaps because Mr. Shesol is ultimately uninterested in legal
doctrine that he so frequently seems to misunderstand it. These misconceptions are displayed at various levels of generality throughout
the book. For example, early in his narrative Mr. Shesol treats the
Court’s doctrine as monolithically antagonistic to humane considerations, arguing that:
By 1937, the Court’s majority had made amply clear that the very notion
of the New Deal—its use of governmental power to relieve the suffering
caused by the Great Depression and to create a new and more just social
and economic order—was an affront to the Constitution, whether that
power was exercised by the federal government or the states.
67

(p. 3).
Yet a mere seventeen pages later he reports that in the First Hundred Days “an exhausted Congress had enacted emergency banking
legislation; a national relief system; . . . securities regulation; a massive
public works program; . . . the Civilian Conservation Corps (“CCC”);
[and] abandoned the gold standard” (p. 20), never pausing to recognize that the Court never declared any of these programs unconstitutional, and in fact—sometimes with the support of “conservative”
68
justices—explicitly upheld several of them. The Civilian Conserva66

67

68

I leave to one side here the question of whether initiatives such as the National Industrial
Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 actually improved human welfare. Mr. Shesol himself canvasses some of the reasons to doubt that they did. See id., at
127–29, 174–75. For other reasons, see CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT,
supra note 26, at 34–35.
Thus, “Social Security . . . seemed certain to fall, as did the National Labor Relations Act,
as did just about everything of significance that Congress had passed or Roosevelt was
likely to propose.” SHESOL, supra note 2, at 3.
See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (upholding abrogation of
the gold clause in private contracts by a vote of 5-4); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330
(1935) (denying damages in cases involving abrogation of the gold clause in government
bonds by a vote of 5-4); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) (denying, in a
Sutherland opinion joined by McReynolds and Butler, a power company standing to challenge grants and loans made by the Emergency Relief Administration of Public Works to
assist in the construction of electrical distribution systems); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood Cnty., 302 U.S. 485 (1938) (same); Cal. Water Serv. Co. v. Redding, 304 U.S. 252
(1938) (per curiam) (relying on Alabama Power Co.); see also City of Allegan, Mich. v. Consumers’ Power Co., 71 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir., 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 586 (1934)
(holding that power company has no right as either a federal or state taxpayer to question the constitutionality of the Public Works Administration); Elec. Bond & Share Co. v.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 303 U.S. 419 (1938) (upholding the registration provisions of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and, by implication, the Securities Act of
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tion Corps was only one of many New Deal spending programs effectively insulated from constitutional attack by Sutherland’s 1923 decision holding that appropriations from general revenue were not subject to judicial review.
Among the others were the Federal
69
70
Emergency Relief Act, the Farm Credit Act, the Reconstruction Fi71
72
nance Corporation, the Rural Electrification Act, and the Emer73
gency Relief Appropriation Act. In addition, of course, the claim
that the Court’s view of the Constitution left no room for “governmental power to relieve the suffering caused by the Great Depression” and to create a “more just social and economic order” also overlooks the Court’s decisions upholding commodity price regulation in
Nebbia, the Minnesota mortgage moratorium in Home Building &
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,74 and the Tennessee Valley Authority in
75
Ashwander, not to mention unanimous Hughes Court decisions up76
holding the Railway Labor Act and its 1934 amendments and the re77
vised Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act.
Just as Mr. Shesol is mistaken in his more general assessment of
the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, so is he misinformed concerning various of its particular features. For example, he argues that
in Schechter:
Hughes did not invent the doctrine of direct versus indirect effects. Rather, he revived it after four decades of disuse and disrepute. Since the
turn of the century, the Court had taken a mostly permissive view of federal regulation of any economic activity that had the potential, however

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in an opinion with Butler joining
Hughes and Roberts). The Court had refrained from invalidating the 1934 Act in Jones v.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). Both McReynolds and Butler also joined opinions apparently assuming the constitutionality of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation.
See Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21, 28 (1939); Graves v. New York ex
rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 492 (1939) (Butler & McReynolds, J.J., dissenting); see also
United States ex rel. Handler v. Hill, 90 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 736,
reh’g. denied, 302 U.S. 779 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation).
Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 55, 56 (1933).
Farm Credit Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 257, 258 (1933).
An Act to Extend the Functions of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for Two
Years, and for Other Purposes, S. 1175, 74th Cong. (1st Sess. 1935).
Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1363, 1364 (1936).
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1597, 1608 (1936).
290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
See Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) and Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
See Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440
(1937).
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indirectly, to impede the flow of interstate commerce. That came to an
abrupt, unforeseen, and seemingly decisive end in Schechter.
78

(p. 135). There are at least four things wrong with this statement.
First, the distinction between direct and indirect effects did not, after
1895, fall into four decades of disuse and disrepute—at least not as
far as the Court was concerned. Over the course of those four decades the Court consistently employed the distinction between direct
and indirect effects both in cases raising questions of federal power
under the affirmative Commerce Clause and in cases arising under
the dormant Commerce Clause. The question in the latter class of
cases was whether a particular state or local tax or regulation affected
interstate commerce sufficiently “directly” to entrench on regulatory
prerogatives the Constitution reserved to Congress. If the effect was
“direct,” the measure was invalid; if it was “indirect,” it passed constitutional muster. In the affirmative Commerce Clause context, the
question was whether the activity in question affected interstate
commerce sufficiently “directly” to fall within Congress’s regulatory
jurisdiction. If the effect was “direct,” it was subject to congressional
79
regulation; if the effect was “indirect,” Congress could not reach it.
Second, in major decisions upholding federal regulation under
the Commerce Clause between 1895 and 1935, the Court routinely
held that the regulated activity affected interstate commerce “direct80
ly.” In not a single case did the Court hold that an effect on inter78

79
80

Mr. Shesol also reports that Schechter repudiated “not just the program but its entire system of minimum wages, maximum hours, and workers’ rights,” SHESOL, supra note 2, at 2,
though the program’s system of minimum wages, maximum hours, and workers’ rights
had no existence apart from the program, and so could not be separately repudiated. To
repudiate the program was to repudiate the system.
Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
1089, 1096–1126 (2000).
See, e.g., Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925) (upholding Sherman Act jurisdiction over labor strife imposing a “direct” rather “indirect” obstruction to interstate commerce); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 36–40
(1923) (upholding Grain Futures Act of 1922 on the grounds that the activities regulated
thereby have a “direct” effect on interstate commerce); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495,
521, 525 (1922) (upholding Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 on grounds that the activities regulated thereby have a “direct” effect on interstate commerce); Standard Oil Co.
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1911) (upholding Sherman Act jurisdiction on
grounds that activities regulated had a “direct” rather than “indirect” effect on interstate
commerce); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396–98 (1905) (holding that activities of meatpackers fell within the reach of the Sherman Act because the effect on interstate commerce was “direct” rather than “indirect”); N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 329–31, 347, 349, 354, 357, 361–62 (1904) (upholding Sherman Act prosecution on
grounds that activities regulated had a “direct” effect on interstate commerce); Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 226, 228–30, 234–35, 238–46 (1899) (upholding Sherman Act prosecution of pooling agreement on grounds that it affected in-
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state commerce that was “indirect” could underwrite congressional
control of the activity. Third, as it had in 1895, when the Court held
that an activity did not fall within congressional jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act, it did so because the effect on interstate commerce
81
was “indirect.” Indeed, just two years before Schechter was decided, a
unanimous bench joined Justice Sutherland’s opinion refusing to enjoin a union’s effort to obtain a closed shop through a strike and boycott of a structural steel manufacturer who shipped his product across
state lines. The company contended that the effect of the union’s actions was to destroy its interstate traffic in steel, but Sutherland insisted that this did not bring the union’s behavior within the ambit of
the Sherman Act’s prohibitions. Even if “the shipment of steel in interstate commerce was curtailed” by the strike and boycott, Sutherland concluded, “that result was incidental, indirect, and re82
mote . . . .”
Fourth, it’s hard to understand how Mr. Shesol could regard
Schechter’s Commerce Clause holding as “unforeseen.” As Ronen
Shamir reports, even the NIRA’s “staunchest supporters did not believe that it could survive a constitutional test. It was passed with the
implicit understanding among the administration’s senior legal advisers that since it would be in effect only two years, judicial review by
83
the Supreme Court might be avoided.” Homer Cummings, Felix
Frankfurter, Jerome Frank, Frances Perkins, and Hugh Johnson all
84
doubted that the statute was constitutional. And with specific reference to Schechter, Justice Department lawyers doubted from the outset
that the Government could prevail on the Commerce Clause issue. A
memorandum from Robert Stern outlining the weaknesses of the
Government’s case remarked that the relationship between local

81
82
83
84

terstate commerce “directly”); United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 560, 565,
568–69, 577 (1898) (upholding Sherman Act prosecution on grounds that activities regulated had a “direct” effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 313, 342, 371 (1897) (upholding Sherman Act prosecution
on grounds that activities regulated had a “direct” effect on interstate commerce).
See, e.g., United Leather Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457
(1924); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 (1933).
RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL 15–16
(1995).
See IRONS, supra note 48, at 23–24; JOSEPH P. LASH, DEALERS AND DREAMERS: A NEW LOOK
AT THE NEW DEAL 122–23 (1988); ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 191 (1976); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, 1933–1935, at 108 (1958); 2 ICKES, supra note 25, at 101;
NATHAN MILLER, FDR: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 328–29 (1983); SHAMIR, supra note 83, at
32–33.
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wages and interstate commerce was so attenuated that the Court
would probably consider it “indirect.” Stern therefore recommended
against expediting the appeal—as did Felix Frankfurter and Tommy
Corcoran—but Donald Richberg persuaded FDR to press on. Solicitor General Stanley Reed tried to prepare Roosevelt for an adverse
decision, and the NRA’s acting general counsel Blackwell Smith re85
garded Schechter as “the weakest possible case.” Even Justice Brandeis joined Hughes’s opinion holding that the effect of interstate com86
merce was “indirect.”
Continuing in this vein, Mr. Shesol reports that “Hughes’s resort
to a largely discredited doctrine” prompted Cardozo to write a separate, concurring opinion, in which Stone joined. (pp. 135–36). Yet
Cardozo also found the effect in question to be indirect. He could
find “no authority” in the Commerce Clause “for the regulation of
wages and hours of labor” in the Schechters’ business. “As to this feature of the case,” he wrote, “little can be added to the opinion of the
court. There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of
commerce. . . . Activities local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national because of distant repercussions.” “To find immediacy or directness here,” Cardozo concluded, “is to find it almost
87
everywhere.” This invocation of the distinction between direct and
indirect effects even by “liberal” members of the Court prompted an
exasperated Edward Corwin to grouse that “the conceptualism, the
determination to resist the inrush of fact with the besom of formula,

85
86

87

CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 157.
Mr. Shesol complains that the Court’s holding on the Commerce Clause issue “was all the
more surprising because the Court had not been required to address the question at all.
Having overturned the NRA on the grounds of its excessive delegation of power . . . the
justices could have left it at that, in keeping with the Court’s tradition of deciding cases
on the narrowest ground possible.” SHESOL, supra note 2, at 135. This characterization
makes the Court’s treatment of the Commerce Clause issue sound gratuitous; but so far
as I am aware, there is no “tradition” under which the Court has declined to decide cases
on more than one constitutional ground, and one can certainly see the value to legislators of the Court providing guidance with respect to the various issues presented in a particular controversy. Compare, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Bank Co. v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555
(1935) (identifying five constitutional defects in the Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act
of 1934 in Brandeis’s opinion) with Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank
of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) (unanimously upholding the 1935 version of the Act revised in accordance with the guidance provided by Brandeis’s opinion in Radford). Of
what value would it have been to Congress to repair the nondelegation problem if the
Commerce Clause problem was also fatal?
A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935).
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which pervades the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court, is not alto88
gether absent from Justice Cardozo’s opinion . . . .”
Mr. Shesol’s uncertain command of doctrine also leads him to
misapprehend the constitutional basis of the Guffey Coal Act. He reports that: “Hoping to placate the Court,” Congress “rested the authority of the new, National Bituminous Coal Commission on the taxing power—seemingly more secure grounds than the commerce
power . . . .” (p. 166). It is true that, under the statute, coal operators
who did not comply with the provisions of the Code would not receive a rebate of the excise tax the Act imposed upon all coal producers. And it is true that one-and-a-half pages of the House Ways
and Means Committee’s Report on the bill did attempt to justify it as
89
an exercise of the taxing power. But this portion of the report was
preceded by a seven-page defense of the bill as an exercise of the
90
President Roosevelt’s famous letter to Reprecommerce power.
sentative Samuel B. Hill urging his subcommittee of the Committee
on Ways and Means to report the bill out notwithstanding the members’ concerns about its constitutionality focused entirely on the
91
Commerce Clause justification.
The bill’s leading supporters in
Congress defended it principally as an exercise of the commerce
92
power. This was because it was widely understood that the “tax” imposed by the statute was not a true tax within the contemplation of
the Court’s taxing power jurisprudence, but instead, as the Court
93
held in the opening passages of its opinion invalidating the statute,
94
a “penalty” on noncompliance with the Code provisions. Its imposition therefore could not be sustained under the taxing power, but instead would have to be defended under the commerce power. After
arguing at length that the bill was supported by Commerce Clause
95
precedents, Chairman Hill concluded:

88
89
90

91
92
93
94

95

E.S. Corwin, The Schechter Case—Landmark, or What?, 13 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 151, 170 (1936).
H.R. REP. NO. 74-1800, at 10–12 (1935).
Id. at 3–10. Indeed, the Senate version of the bill, which also provided for a tax and rebate scheme, was referred to and reported out by the Committee on Interstate Commerce. S. REP. 74-470 (1935).
FDR to Samuel B. Hill, July 5, 1935, reprinted in 79 CONG. REC. 13449 (1935).
See R. ALTON LEE, A HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAXATION 155–56 (1973); 79 CONG. REC.
13448–54 (remarks of Mr. Vinson) (1935).
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 288–29 (1936).
See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); H.R. REP. 74-1800, at 46 (1935)
(Views of the Minority); id. at 52–54 (Views of Mr. Cooper of Tennessee); 79 CONG. REC.
13436, 13484–85 (remarks of Mr. Treadway); id. at 13462–63 (remarks of Mr. Cooper of
Tennessee); id. at 13467 (remarks of Mr. Church).
79 CONG. REC. 13442–66.
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If Congress has the right to regulate this industry, then it has the right to
regulate by taxation. Even if the tax should be held to be a penalty, yet if
Congress has jurisdiction over the subject matter, if it has the power to
regulate the industry, it makes no difference whether the tax is for revenue or for penalty or regulation, because in either event it would come
under the regulatory power of Congress. That is what we are relying on
96
[with] this bill, that it directly affects and burdens interstate commerce.

When Assistant Attorney General Dickinson was defending the
statute before the Court, he admitted at the outset of his argument
that: “There is general agreement that the statute rests upon the
commerce power. The tax provision stands or falls with the validity of
97
the scheme of regulation under the commerce power.” The statute
did not really, as Mr. Shesol claims, seek to “placate the Court” by
resting the authority of the Commission on the “more secure
grounds” of the taxing power.
1. The Minimum Wage Cases
These unsuccessful encounters with constitutional doctrine do not
inspire confidence in Mr. Shesol’s capacity to evaluate the scope and
extent of the constitutional change wrought during Hughes’s tenure
as Chief Justice. One’s concerns are to some extent borne out in his
treatment of the Court’s decisions in 1937. Consider first his treatment of the minimum wage cases: Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipal98
do, where in 1936, a 5-4 majority invalidated New York’s statute, and
99
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, in which a 5-4 majority upheld Washington State’s statute in 1937. Mr. Shesol does not do too badly in his
analysis of Tipaldo, but he does make the occasional misstep. He recognizes, for example, that in 1934 Nebbia “gave states more room to
regulate economic activity in the public interest.” (pp. 218–19). He
accurately reports that “New York argued that its minimum-wage law
could be distinguished from D.C.’s, and was therefore not controlled
by Adkins,” the 1923 decision in which the Court had invalidated the
100
District’s statute.
But he then goes on to maintain that New York
“also called for ‘a reconsideration’ of Adkins—a polite way of asking
the justices to overrule it.” (pp. 219–20). He later contends that the
lawyers for New York had “expressly challenged Adkins. While New
York had undeniably staked its case primarily on the grounds of dis96
97
98
99
100

79 CONG. REC. 13446.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 255 (1936).
298 U.S. 587 (1936).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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tinguishing the statutes, it also hedged its bets. The state’s petition
called for ‘reconsideration of the Adkins decision in the light of the
New York act and conditions aimed to be remedied thereby.’ New
York, it seems clear, was suggesting that Adkins be cast aside. The
state’s attorneys had marked out dual paths to the same result.” (p.
414).
It is true that the state called for “reconsideration” of Adkins. But
the contention that this was a request that the Court overrule Adkins
rests, in my view, on a misreading of the documents. The petition
filed by the state of New York did not explicitly request that Adkins be
overruled. The overwhelming bulk of the petition was devoted to
identifying material legal and factual distinctions between the New
York statute and the measure invalidated in Adkins. Of all of the
“Questions Presented,” “Reasons for Allowing this Writ,” and “Assignments of Error” raised in the petition, only one might plausibly
have been construed to request that Adkins be overruled. The sixth
of the “Reasons for Allowing this Writ” stated: “the circumstances
prevailing under which the New York law was enacted call for a reconsideration of the Adkins case in light of the New York act and
101
conditions aimed to be remedied thereby.” This was by no means
an unequivocal call for a repudiation of Adkins. It might more readily
have been understood as a restatement of New York’s central argument: that material distinctions between the language of the two
statutes and the intervention of an economic depression made the
New York statute a reasonable exercise of the police power where the
District of Columbia statute had not been. Insofar as Adkins was the
controlling precedent regarding the validity of minimum wage regulation, any case concerning the constitutionality of a minimum wage
statute would necessarily involve the construction and consideration
of that precedent to determine its scope and meaning.
This appears to have been the way that Chief Justice Hughes construed this language in the petition. In his dissent, in which he contended that Tipaldo was not controlled by Adkins due to material differences in the two statutes involved and the social conditions to
which each was addressed, he wrote that the close divisions of the
102
Court in Stettler v. O’Hara and Adkins “point to the desirability of
fresh consideration when there are material differences in the cases
101
102

Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Motion to Advance at 4–5, 8–9, 12–24; Tipaldo, 298
U.S. at 636 (Stone, J., dissenting).
243 U.S. 629 (1917) (affirming by an equally divided court the judgment of the Oregon
Supreme Court upholding that state’s minimum wage law for women, with Justice
Brandeis not participating).
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103

presented.”
Though he purported to undertake such “fresh consideration,” nowhere in his opinion did he consider whether Adkins
ought to be overruled.
The petition certainly was sufficiently ambiguous that it was not
unreasonable for the justices to construe it in light of the arguments
advanced in the brief and at oral argument. And neither in the brief
nor at the argument did attorneys for the state request or suggest that
Adkins be overruled. The brief instead offered a detailed explanation
of why the New York statute was consistent with and indeed supported by Adkins. Similarly, briefs of amici curiae contended that “[t]he
New York statute differs radically from that considered by this Court
in the Adkins case,” and “[t]he New York Minimum Wage Law, passed
in the light of the decision in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S.
104
525, is supported as to constitutionality by the opinion in that case.”
105
Nowhere was it requested that Adkins be overruled.
This reading of the documents is supported by Roberts’ later account of the conference following the oral argument in Tipaldo. Roberts reported that:
Both in the petition for certiorari, in the brief on the merits, and in oral
argument, counsel for the State of New York took the position that it was
unnecessary to overrule the Adkins case in order to sustain the position of
the State of New York. It was urged that further data and experience and
additional facts distinguished the case at bar from the Adkins case . . . .
The State had not asked that the Adkins case be overruled but that it be
distinguished. I said I was unwilling to put a decision on any such
106
ground.

Justice Butler’s majority opinion similarly maintained that:
The petition for the writ sought review upon the ground that this case is
distinguishable from [Adkins]. No application has been made for reconsideration of the constitutional question there decided. The validity of
the principles upon which that decision rests is not challenged. This
court confines itself to the ground upon which the writ was asked or
granted. [citations omitted] Here the review granted was no broader
than that sought by the petitioner. [citations omitted] He is not entitled
and does not ask to be heard upon the question whether the Adkins case

103
104

105
106

Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 624 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
Appellant’s Brief on the Law, Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 16–49; Brief on Behalf of States of Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellant, Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 15; Motion for Leave to File Brief as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, filed by John W. Bricker, Attorney General of Ohio,
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 39.
Accord Erwin N. Griswold, Owen J. Roberts As A Judge, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 332, 341 (1955).
Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 314 (1955).
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should be overruled. He maintains that it may be distinguished on the
107
ground that the statutes are vitally dissimilar.

Hughes’s dissenting opinion did not challenge the majority’s
claim that the petition confined the justices to consideration of
whether the case was distinguishable from Adkins. Indeed, Mr. Shesol
himself later concedes that on Hughes’s view, Adkins “was not at issue
in Tipaldo, had not been challenged by New York’s lawyers, and
should therefore remain standing.” (p. 405). And though Justice
Stone’s dissent briefly called attention to the petition’s request for a
“reconsideration” of Adkins, he did not deem it necessary to interpret
this as a demand that the decision be overruled. Instead, he insisted
that it did not matter. “I know of no rule or practice by which the arguments advance in support of an application for certiorari restrict
our choice between conflicting precedents in deciding a question of
constitutional law which the petition, if granted, requires us to answer,” he wrote:
Here the question which the petition specifically presents is whether the
New York statute contravenes that Fourteenth Amendment . . . . Unless
we are now to construe and apply the Fourteenth Amendment without
regard to our decisions since the Adkins case, we could not rightly avoid
its reconsideration even if it were not asked. We should follow our deci108
sion in the Nebbia case . . . .

Accordingly, as Mr. Shesol correctly reports, Stone wrote an opinion, joined by Brandeis and Cardozo, calling for Adkins to be overruled. But as Mr. Shesol points out, Chief Justice Hughes was not
prepared to overrule Adkins. “He was prepared to dissent, but only
on narrow grounds. More practiced than the others in the art of fine
shadings, more inclined to inch away—by often imperceptible degrees—from a troublesome precedent than to overrule it, Hughes
was prepared to differentiate and uphold New York’s statute . . . and
leave Adkins standing—irrelevant, apparently unloved, but still standing.” (pp. 219–20). Butler had originally circulated a draft opinion
confined to the holding that Adkins had not been challenged by New
York and was therefore controlling authority, but Stone’s dissent
prompted Butler to enlarge his opinion with “brusque” obiter dicta
defending Adkins “angrily, and in sweeping terms.” (pp. 220). This
109
perplexed Roberts, who later wrote that his “proper course would
110
have been to concur specially on the narrow ground I had taken.”
107
108
109
110

Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 604–05.
Id. at 636 (Stone, J., dissenting).
PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, supra note 17, at 701 (reporting that the “reactionary
tone” of Butler’s enlarged opinion “was very distasteful to Roberts”).
Frankfurter, supra note 106, at 315.
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In the margin of Felix Frankfurter’s copy of Merlo Pusey’s 1951 biography of Hughes, one finds next to the discussion of Roberts’ conduct in Tipaldo the notation, “He shouldn’t have suppressed his own
111
views by silence.”
The contention that New York requested that Adkins be overruled
in Tipaldo is therefore at the very least deeply problematic. But so is
the opposing contention that New York’s failure to make such a request itself adequately explains Roberts’ behavior in the minimum
wage cases. It is true that in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish the Washington
Supreme Court, unlike the New York Court of Appeals in Tipaldo,
had effectively declared that Adkins already had been overruled. As
Chief Justice Hughes put it: “The state court has refused to regard
the decision in the Adkins case as determinative and has pointed to
our decisions both before and since that case as justifying its posi112
tion.”
It is also true that counsel for the Appellant observed that
“the issue before this Court is simply whether the Adkins case is to be
reconsidered and reversed or whether its authority is to be sus113
tained.” And because the Washington statute, unlike the New York
measure, was virtually identical to the law struck down in Adkins, it is
difficult to see how the Court could have upheld the Washington
statute without overruling Adkins. But it is not clear that it followed
that the “ruling of the state court demands on our part a reexamina114
tion of the Adkins case,” as Hughes concluded. For starters, the party defending the statute in Parrish was the appellee rather than the
appellant, and therefore, unlike the New York attorney general in Tipaldo, did not frame the question to be considered on appeal. Moreover, the briefs and arguments of the attorneys for the state of Washington did not request that Adkins be overruled. Roberts’ later
recollection that in Parrish “the authority of Adkins was definitely assailed and the Court was asked to reconsider and overrule it” was not
fully accurate. Even though the state court had refused to apply Adkins, the justices were certainly at liberty to strike down the Washington statute on the grounds that its controlling authority had not been
specifically challenged by the litigants.

111

112
113
114

PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, supra note 17, at 701; Frankfurter’s personal copy, microformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, at Part II, Reel 39. See also BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
265 n.7 (1998).
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389 (1937).
Appellant’s Answer to Brief of Amicus Curiae at 18, West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 379.
West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 389–90.
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What, then, explains Roberts’ change, which, in a chapter entitled
“The Yielding,” Mr. Shesol characterizes as a “remarkabl[e]” (p. 406)
“surprise” (p. 404)? Mr. Shesol concedes that it could not have been
the Court-packing plan, a closely-guarded secret that was announced
publicly more than six weeks after Roberts had cast his decisive vote
in conference. “[T]he facts, as Roberts later insisted, would seem to
establish ‘that no action taken by the President . . . had any causal relation to my action in the Parrish case.’” (p. 415). Instead, Mr. Shesol
flirts with a handful of alternative possibilities. One is “the scale of
Roosevelt’s reelection” in November of 1936. (p. 415). But it is difficult to understand how this could have been a factor. For in 1936 the
Republican platform explicitly endorsed minimum wages for women
and children, as did the party’s nominee, former Progressive Bull
Moose crusader Alf Landon. Even assuming that the justices followed
the election returns—which seems doubtful in view of the string of
invalidations they handed down in the wake of the Democrats’ stunning success in the 1934 midterm elections—the 1936 election could
provide them with no additional information concerning popular attitudes toward the minimum wage. It was already abundantly clear
115
that both parties and both candidates were for it.
And as Mr.
Shesol reports: “Roosevelt did not suppose that his triumph at the
polls had in any way chastened the Court; the old maxim that ‘the
Court follows the election returns’ could not possibly apply to an institution that had been flouting, so consistently and flagrantly, the
116
popular will.” (p. 3).
A second possible causal factor, Mr. Shesol suggests, was “through
1936, the mounting threat—or certainty—that either FDR or Congress was about to take serious action to curb the Court.” (p. 415).

115
116

CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 25–28.
At one point Mr. Shesol appears to suggest that the Court more generally responded to
the election returns. “Starting in November,” he observes, “the Court had issued a series
of opinions that indicated it might be yielding to the popular will.” Yet in each of the
three cases he cites, the vote was either unanimous or near-unanimous. SHESOL, supra
note 2, at 264–65. The Four Horsemen, who already had voted to dissent in Parrish, and
would later dissent in cases upholding the National Labor Relations Act and the Social
Security Act, surely were not moved by the election returns to join these earlier opinions.
If following the election “conservative justices” now seemed to treat “government lawyers
with greater respect—or at least with less overt hostility,” perhaps that was because the
cases they were arguing presented far less contentious issues. Id. at 243. Ultimately, Mr.
Shesol does not press this claim, remarking instead that “the peace that prevailed in the
winter of 1936–37 was not a permanent one . . . . The election results, so resounding that
they had seemed to answer every question, now appeared, on reflection, to have settled
very little. At the most basic level, it was unclear whether voters wanted to press ahead
with further reforms, or simply improve existing New Deal programs.” Id. at 265–66.
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This also is doubtful. After all, if it was virtually certain by December
19, 1936, when Roberts voted to uphold the Washington minimum
wage statute, that Roosevelt would introduce a serious Court-curbing
proposal, one has to wonder why it came as such a great surprise to
Democratic leaders on the Hill and to other observers around the
country when he did so more than six weeks later. (pp. 292–306). As
Mr. Shesol points out, Roosevelt had deliberately steered clear of any
discussion of the Court during the campaign. In 1936 the economy
was improving, the opposition was weak, and there was no political
upside and considerable political downside to taking on the Court
before the election. Indeed, the Court’s decisions in Schechter and
Butler had removed two millstones from around his neck, and his
polling numbers were improving as a result. (p. 215). So instead of
making the Court a campaign issue, FDR’s platform had pledged the
administration to address the nation’s economic and social problems
“through legislation within the Constitution” or, if that should prove
impracticable, through “a clarifying amendment.” Moreover, hundreds of similar court-curbing proposals had been introduced in
Congress in the preceding two sessions, without producing any dis117
cernible effect on the Court’s performance.
A third suggestion offered by Mr. Shesol is that the general outpouring of criticism following the announcement of the Court’s decision in Tipaldo might have affected Roberts’ performance in Parrish.
As Mr. Shesol puts it, “a credible case can be made that Roberts and
Hughes were influenced by the criticism of Tipaldo; or by rising popular exasperation with the Court; or the indignation of the legal journals . . . .” (p. 415). “If any justice could have shrugged off the criticism,” Mr. Shesol maintains, “that justice was not Owen Roberts. He
cared greatly—too greatly, some of his friends believed—about his
reputation.” (p. 413). “[I]n the view of a reporter who knew him socially, Roberts was ‘too anxious for worldly approval.’ And when, in
1936, he and the rest of the conservative majority became objects of
widespread scorn and ridicule—when even Republicans began to
hold them at arm’s length—the public lashing may have hurt Roberts
118
more deeply than the others.” (p. 231).
117
118

CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 12–14, 27.
Mr. Shesol’s discussion of the relationship between Tipaldo and the possibility that either
Stone or Roberts might receive the Republican nomination for president in 1936 is particularly curious. On the same page he manages to write first that Stone’s dissent in Tipaldo put an end to talk of the possibility of his being nominated, and then in the next
paragraph to write that Roberts’ vote with the majority in Tipaldo put an end to rumors
that he might be nominated. SHESOL, supra note 2, at 231. This contrast leaves it unclear
how any justice participating in Tipaldo could have satisfied Republicans in 1936.

236

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:1

Perhaps. Roosevelt suggested such a sensitivity to criticism when
he remarked in the wake of the 1936 decision upholding the TVA by
a vote of 8-1 that: “‘It did those babies good to criticize them a bit.’”
(p. 210). But Mr. Shesol reports that Justice Stone “saw no sign that
his conservative colleagues had yielded to external pressure,” and
“fretted, privately, that this was ‘the popular impression.’” (pp. 210–
11). As Mr. Shesol himself maintains, “the four or five most conservative justices, with every opinion they wrote against the New Deal,
seemed almost to invite public outrage, to welcome it.” (p. 3). Insofar as the suggestion would be that Roberts changed his substantive
views on the question of the constitutionality of the minimum wage in
response to this criticism, one has to wonder why Roberts would have
joined or written so many heavily criticized decisions in the first
119
place. For example, as Mr. Shesol points out, in the press reaction
to Butler commentators generally concluded that Stone’s dissent had
the better of the argument. (p. 232). And yet despite this, Roberts
continued after Butler to vote to invalidate the Guffey Coal Act in
Carter Coal and the minimum wage in Tipaldo. Where, one wonders,
was his concern for “worldly approval” then? This would suggest that
the justice generally retired to “‘a soundproof room’” (p. 523) to
consider his decisions, but that on this particular occasion the chamber’s noise-reduction technology malfunctioned.
In fairness, Mr. Shesol suggests that the noise generated in the
wake of Tipaldo was simply of a different order than anything that had
come before. He reports that “out of 344 editorials on the Tipaldo
ruling, only 10 supported it. Not only that: dozens of the most conservative papers went a step (perhaps several steps) further and said
that if the states lacked any power to fight sweatshop conditions, then
the Constitution might have to be amended after all.” (p. 222).
“Here, at last, was the wave of national revulsion that had been expected for years and had failed, until now, to materialize. When the
Court had overturned the NRA, the AAA, and the Guffey Coal Act,
when it chiseled away at states’ rights in other decisions, there had
been protests, clamor, but nothing like this.” (p. 222). This was because the minimum wage, unlike the New Deal, had quietly achieved
“overwhelming popularity. More than a third of the states had such
laws on the books, in some cases for decades. The minimum wage
served an obvious and desperate human need. And though the poli119

In what impresses me as a strained reading of Justice Sutherland’s Parrish dissent, Mr.
Shesol characterizes it as a “scolding” of Roberts “for bowing to public opinion or the
pressure of his peers,” reporting that during its delivery “Roberts, with reason, looked annoyed” and “glanced coldly at his accuser.” Id. at 407–08.
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cy did reflect a certain paternalism, it was no weird concoction of the
Brain Trust, it had put down deep roots, and even the Liberty League
could hardly be roused to condemn it.” (p. 222).
One must wonder, of course, whether Roberts could have been so
ignorant of the broad and deep public support for the minimum
wage before the fact that the reaction to Tipaldo would have greatly
surprised him. Yet perhaps in light of Roberts’ apparent general lack
of responsiveness to “clamor” over the Court’s decisions, and taking
into account Roberts’ earlier decision in Nebbia, Mr. Shesol ultimately
stops short of asserting this stronger relationship between the reaction to Tipaldo and Roberts’ vote in Parrish. Instead, he is more circumspect, affirming that “[i]f any of this had an effect on the decision, it can never be measured; nor would it suggest that either justice
changed his basic beliefs in the face of events.” He modestly maintains that the question of Roberts’ motivation “ha[s] never really
been answered,” and is a matter about which “one could only speculate.” (p. 415).
Mr. Shesol is prepared to offer a speculation, however, and in doing so he follows the thoughtfully-considered judgments reached by
Merlo Pusey, Richard Friedman, and Edward Purcell that the public
outcry following the Tipaldo decision might have prompted Roberts
120
to face squarely the question of Adkins’ continued vitality. That reaction, Mr. Shesol argues, may have made Hughes and Roberts “more
likely to examine his beliefs and then act on them—to take a bold
step, to confront a tough choice and no longer avoid it.” (p. 415).
[O]ne need not speculate wildly to posit that some of these events, to
some degree, weighed on the minds of Roberts and Hughes and placed a
finger on their internal scales. This would explain their relief when the
minimum-wage issue came back before the Court so soon after Tipaldo . . . . Their later protestations aside, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that they shed their self-imposed restraints and faced the fundamental issue because events had led them to see Parrish as precisely what they
wished it to be: a second chance, a shot at redemption.

(p. 415).
This is a plausible conjecture that has been embraced by the eminent scholars to whom I have referred, and they may well be correct.
I certainly cannot prove that they are not. But I do not believe that
Mr. Shesol’s conclusion is as difficult to escape as he makes it out to
120

MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS 51 (1937); Merlo J. Pusey, Justice Roberts’ 1937
Turnaround, 1983 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC. 102, 106; Richard Friedman, Switching Time and
Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1893, 1952 (1994); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Rethinking Constitutional Change, 80 VA. L.
REV. 277, 289–90 (1994).
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be. Instead, I believe that the performances of Hughes and Roberts
in the minimum wage cases can be explained adequately without reference to the public reaction to Tipaldo. Let us take Hughes first.
The Chief Justice had a strong preference for distinguishing rather
than overruling precedents where possible, a preference that has
121
been noted by many and, as Mr. Shesol notes, was lamented by
122
Stone in the wake of Tipaldo.
In Tipaldo, Hughes believed that a
relevant distinction could be drawn, and he sought to sustain the
statute on that basis. No such distinction was available in Parrish, and
Hughes therefore was squarely confronted with the option of either
invalidating the statute on the authority of Adkins or sustaining the
minimum wage law by overruling the 1923 precedent.
As for Roberts, the memorandum he prepared is not without its
difficulties, but some of his recollections point toward the understanding ultimately articulated by his later confidante, Felix Frankfurter. Roberts reported that at the conference at which certiorari was
granted in Tipaldo, he told his colleagues that he “saw no reason to
grant the writ unless the Court were prepared to re-examine and
123
overrule the Adkins case.” This would suggest that Roberts was not
saying that he would not reach the issue of Adkins’ continuing authority unless New York asked him to; he was instead saying that he was

121

122

123

Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35 (1967) (remarking on Hughes’s “talent for making nice distinctions in the interest of creative continuity. He thoroughly disliked the overruling of a precedent, but his gift for differentiation fostered the controlled evolution of doctrine”); SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 279 (1951) (“He sought, virtually above all else, to
maintain the dignity and prestige of the Court and this he thought in no small measure
depended upon the stability of its decisions. This attitude was reflected . . . in the great
lengths to which he sometimes went . . . in attempting to find distinctions to avoid overruling precedent. . . . [He] sedulously sought to protect the precedents of the Court,
sometimes at the risk of offending logic.”). See also MASON, supra note 58, at 796 (remarking on Hughes’s capacity “to invent meaningless distinctions”); F.D.G. Ribble, The Constitutional Doctrines of Chief Justice Hughes, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1210 (1941) (claiming
that Hughes possessed “a consummate skill in distinguishing adverse or apparently adverse cases”). Justice Roberts himself later commented on this quality. See OWEN J.
ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 18 (1951) (describing one of Hughes’s
opinions as having “labored valiantly, and, as I think, unsuccessfully, to distinguish the
earlier cases”). Paul Freund once characterized a distinction drawn by Hughes as one
that “could be remembered just long enough to be stated once.” Freund, supra note 121,
at 35.
Alpheus Thomas Mason reports that Stone, who joined Hughes’s dissent, thought it “‘a
sad business to stand only on differences of the two statutes,’” and “could not understand
why ‘the Chief Justice felt it necessary to so limit his opinion.’” MASON, supra note 58, at
423 (quoting Stone to Frankfurter, June 3, 1936). See also SHESOL, supra note 2, at 219–
20.
Frankfurter, supra note 106, at 314.
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prepared to consider the issue of whether Adkins should be overruled, but that he would not join an opinion upholding the New York
statute on the ground that it was distinguishable from the measure
invalidated in Adkins. At the conference following the argument
Roberts reports that he stated that he was “unwilling to put a decision” on the ground for which New York had argued, namely, that
124
the two statutes could be meaningfully distinguished. It is unclear
whether Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo had yet expressed their view
that a decision upholding the statute should be based on a rejection
of Adkins’ authority, but it was almost certainly clear, as was ultimately
the case, that Hughes would not join such an opinion. Roberts did
not believe that the Court could legitimately sustain the statute unless
there were a majority to overrule Adkins. Because there was not, he
acquiesced in an opinion invalidating the statute on the authority of
Adkins—just as Holmes and Stone had in the 1920s, even when state
125
attorneys had specifically requested that the Court overrule Adkins.
As Frankfurter put it in 1955, “when the Tipaldo case was before the
Court in the spring of 1936,” Roberts “was prepared to overrule the
Adkins decision. Since a majority could not be had for overrruling it,
he silently agreed with the Court in finding the New York statute under attack in the Tipaldo case not distinguishable from the statute
126
which had been declared unconstitutional in the Adkins case.” Two
years earlier Frankfurter had written to Paul Freund: “The fact is that
Roberts did not switch. He was prepared in Tipaldo to make a majority overruling Adkins. He was not prepared to distinguish Adkins. Because there was no majority for overrruling Adkins he was in the ma127
jority in the Morehead case. . . .”
124
125

126
127

Id.
See Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (including Taft, Holmes, Sanford, and Stone all concurring silently in affirming per curiam a decision invalidating Arkansas minimum wage statute on authority of Adkins); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530
(1925) (including Brandeis alone dissenting from per curiam decision striking down Arizona’s minimum wage statute, with Taft, Sanford, and Stone concurring silently and
Holmes concurring only because he regarded himself as bound by the authority of Adkins). As Charles Curtis noted: “Roberts had done no more by joining with the exmajority [in Tipaldo] than to follow [Adkins] as a precedent that was binding on him. No
more, indeed, than Holmes himself had done, when he accepted Adkins in the two cases
that had come up from Arizona and Arkansas shortly afterwards.” CHARLES CURTIS,
LIONS UNDER THE THRONE: A STUDY OF THE SUPREME COURT 163–64 (1947).
Frankfurter, supra note 106, at 314. Paul Freund apparently concurred in this interpretation. See Freund, supra note 121, at 29–30.
Felix Frankfurter to Paul Freund, microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law
School Library, at Part III, Reel 15, quoted in Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the
Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 633 n.78 (1994). See also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 479 (“Prepared to reverse Adkins but not to distinguish it, Roberts
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Interestingly, Frankfurter’s understanding may help to resolve a
difficulty with the account that attempts to shift the blame to the New
York attorney general for failing to request that the Court overrule
Adkins. Several commentators who question that account have rightly
128
observed that in 1938 Roberts voted in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins to
129
overrule the nearly century-old precedent of Swift v. Tyson even
though neither of the parties had challenged the vitality of that deci130
sion.
Edward Purcell has plausibly and charitably suggested that
Roberts may have felt so badly burned by the Tipaldo fiasco that he
131
thereafter revised his approach to such issues.
That may be true,
but if Frankfurter’s understanding is correct, then Erie may support
rather than impeach the claim that Roberts was consistent in these
matters. For when Hughes presented Erie to the conference, he announced that: “If we wish to overrule Swift v. Tyson, here is our op132
portunity.”
Perhaps in part as a result of Hughes’s leadership—
which may have been prompted by the Tipaldo experience—a majority to overrule Swift was assembled. In Tipaldo, by contrast, Hughes
was not prepared to overrule Adkins, and as a consequence, no majority to do so could be formed. If this account of the minimum wages
cases is correct, then it is hard to see Parrish as representing any kind
133
of “yielding.”
Indeed, if this account is correct, then it lends support to a possibility that Mr. Shesol entertains but is ultimately reluctant to embrace. One reason that Roberts may have been persuaded to uphold
the minimum wage statute in Parrish, Mr. Shesol suggests, was the extensive reliance Hughes’s majority opinion placed on Roberts’ opinion in Nebbia: “Following Roberts’s own reasoning, Hughes marched
to the finish. Nebbia had crippled the doctrine of substantive due
process, and now Parrish finished it off.” (pp. 406–07). Had this “af-

128
129
130

131
132
133

felt that existing alternatives left him no choice but to vote with those who would strike
down the New York law”); THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 81 n.89 (1956) (“Mr. Justice Roberts’s position in the
two cases can be harmonized as the view of one who was unable to distinguish the Adkins
case but who would accept an opportunity to overrule it.”).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41 U.S. 1 (1842).
See John W. Chambers, The Big Switch: Justice Roberts and the Minimum-Wage Cases, 10 LAB.
HIST. 44, 66–67 (1969); HENDEL, supra note 121, at 130; Michael E. Parrish, The Hughes
Court, the Great Depression, and the Historians, 40 HIST. 286, 296 (1978); Purcell, supra note
120, at 289–90.
Purcell, supra note 120, at 289–90.
MASON, supra note 58, at 478.
I elaborate portions of this account in greater detail in CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 92–104.
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firmation of Nebbia brought Roberts on board?” “Perhaps,” Mr.
Shesol concedes, but he then adds that “Hughes had cited Nebbia in
his Tipaldo dissent as well—to no discernible effect.” (p. 407). It is
true that Hughes cited Nebbia in Tipaldo, but there he had not been
prepared to say of it what he would in Parrish, namely, that he found
it “impossible to reconcile” Adkins with the “well-considered declara134
tions” of the Nebbia opinion. Perhaps it was not a mere citation to
Nebbia that made the difference to Roberts, but rather a frank recognition of its implications for Adkins, implications that so many com135
mentators had perceived in the wake of Nebbia’s announcement.
2. The Labor Board Cases
Mr. Shesol’s account of the cases challenging the constitutionality
of the National Labor Relations Act is similarly plagued by doctrinal
misunderstandings, and again uneasily juxtaposes internal and external explanatory factors. He observes that the drafters of the statute
“wrote a preamble to the act that read like a legal brief. It took pains
to establish that labor issues were not—as many, perhaps most, of the
justices believed—a local concern . . . .” (p. 422). It is true that the
act’s preamble took such pains, but the notion that many or most of
the justices believed that “labor issues” were “a local concern” rests
upon yet another deficiency in Mr. Shesol’s grasp of doctrine. It is
true that under some circumstances the Court had regarded employment relations as a local matter over which the states alone had
136
jurisdiction. But the Court had made clear in numerous decisions
that there were circumstances under which such relations fell under
congressional jurisdiction. In several cases the justices had held that
industrial disputes might be reached under the Sherman Act where
137
there was proof of intent to restrain interstate commerce.
And in
the domain of interstate transportation, the Court had upheld the
138
federal Hours of Service Act; the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
139
which abrogated employers’ common law tort defenses; the Federal

134
135
136

137

138
139

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–98 (1937).
See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 81–83.
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 (1933); United Leather Workers
Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924); United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters’ Ass’n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Coronado Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443 (1921); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 221 U.S. 612 (1911).
Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
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140

Safety Appliance Act; and the Adamson Act, which regulated both
141
In
wages and hours of railroad employees during World War I.
1930, the justices unanimously upheld the self-organization provi142
sions of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 as applied to railway clerks.
Seven years later another unanimous bench would uphold the collective bargaining provisions of the 1934 amendments to the Act and
143
their application to back-shop employees.
In view of these many well-established precedents, it is simply extraordinary for Mr. Shesol to claim that Roberts’ 1935 opinion invalidating the Railway Pension Act of 1934 “had not only questioned but
ridiculed the idea that labor relations had anything to do with interstate commerce.” (p. 432). His opinion in Alton did nothing of the
sort. The majority’s view was not that “labor relations” had nothing
to do with interstate commerce, but instead that the relationship between interstate commerce and a specific type of labor regulation—
retirement pensions for workers—was too attenuated to support federal regulation. What makes this extravagant accusation all the more
astonishing is the fact that Mr. Shesol implicitly concedes its inaccuracy a mere two pages earlier. The Court’s unanimous opinion upholding the application of the NLRA to an interstate bus company,
he writes, could not be considered a “breakthrough,” “since interstate
bus companies were in the business of carrying people across state
lines . . . .” (pp. 429–30).
The fact that this decision upholding the NLRA was regarded as
unsurprising underscores the exaggerated nature of Mr. Shesol’s
claim that “almost no one believed the act was constitutional.” (p.
421). It would be more accurate to say that many harbored doubts
concerning the constitutionality of certain of its potential applica144
tions. Chief among these were labor disputes at manufacturing es140
141
142
143
144

S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (McReynolds did not participate).
Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
Consider, for example, the comparative margins by which the NLRA and the Guffey Coal
Act were passed in Congress. The NLRA passed the Senate by a vote of 63-12. 79 CONG.
REC. 7681, at 2415 (1935). It was passed in the House by a voice vote. 79 CONG. REC.
9731, at 3228 (1935). By contrast, the Guffey Coal Act, which Homer Cummings had told
FDR was “clearly unconstitutional,” SHESOL, supra note 26, at 153, had been pried out of
Committee only by the extraordinary intervention of the president, who urged the members not to “permit doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation.” Franklin D. Roosevelt to Samuel B. Hill, July 5, 1935, reprinted in 79
CONG. REC. 13449 (1935). Because of such constitutional doubts, the Guffey Coal Act was
passed in the Senate by the much narrower margin of 45-37. 79 CONG. REC. 14084
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tablishments. With this concern in mind, as Mr. Shesol reports, the
Act’s “Findings and Policy” maintained that labor disputes “burden145
ing or obstructing” the free flow of commerce might be “part of a
current of commerce that stretched, unbroken, across the nation.”
In such cases “strikes and other standoffs over wages, hours, pensions,
and working conditions” could have “a direct effect on interstate
commerce. When workers walked out or sat down, plants were shuttered; when plants were shuttered, goods could not flow.” (p. 422).
In accordance with this legal theory, “the lawyers of the Labor Board
developed a master plan for testing the Wagner Act’s constitutionality. They scoured the dockets of appellate courts across the country
for labor cases that combined the most abusive practices, the most
sympathetic victims, and the most auspicious set of legal issues. The
government’s lawyers carefully selected cases concerning large companies and small ones, major industries and lesser ones, businesses
that manufactured goods, and businesses that provided services—all
with direct bearing (the board’s lawyers believed) on interstate commerce.” (p. 423).
Those charged with administering the statute and defending it in
Court certainly shared Senator Wagner’s faith in its constitutionali146
ty.
Charles Fahy, general counsel to the National Labor Relations
Board, felt that his job in preparing test cases for the Wagner Act “was
immeasurably assisted by the careful draftsmanship of this beautifully
drafted statute.” Despite the Court’s recent decision in Carter Coal, he
was confident that the NLRA would survive constitutional challenge
147
before the Court.
Fahy maintained that “the Wagner Act should
have been sustained on the basis of precedents,” and was “not inclined to attribute the fact that it was sustained to anything but that it
was believed to be constitutional.” “In fact,” he confessed, “I thought

145

146
147

(1935). It passed in the House by a vote of 194-68. 79 CONG. REC. 13666–67 (1935). In
the Senate, twenty-four Democrats joined twelve Democrats and one Farmer-Laborite in
voting against the Guffey bill; in the House, ninety-three Democrats joined seventy-three
Republicans and two Progressives in opposition. See Thomas C. Longin, Coal, Congress,
and the Courts: The Bituminous Coal Industry and the New Deal, 35 WEST VIRGINIA HIST. 101,
110–111 (1974). For more detail, see, e.g., CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT, supra note 26, at 159–61 (describing the origins of the Guffey Coal Act and the
results of the final vote).
H.R. REP. NO. 1147 (1935), reprinted in UNITED STATES NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 3032–33,
3035 (1985).
See IRONS, supra note 48, at 231–32 (outlining the due process and commerce clause arguments that Senator Wagner used to argue that the Act was constitutional).
Id. at 252–53 (quoting from author interview with Charles Fahy, June 22, 1978).
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it might be sustained by a vote other than Roberts’.” Fahy was utterly confident that Hughes and Roberts would vote to uphold the Act,
and “encouraged his staff to prepare their arguments on the assumption that an unfavorable decision in Carter would not invalidate the
149
Wagner Act . . . .”
After Carter was handed down, NLRB Chairman Warren Madden
similarly exuded confidence. Madden insisted that “‘It is obvious that
decisions which relate to work on a commodity before the commodity
has begun to move on an interstate journey, or after it has reached
the end of an interstate journey, do not justify a prediction that the
court will apply the same rule to work on a commodity which is at a
mid-point in a long interstate journey.’” The Court’s stream of commerce precedents established that “local” activities, such as those taking place in the Chicago stockyards, were subject to federal control if
they were located in a current of interstate commerce. Those precedents made it “obvious,” Madden asserted, that the Wagner Act could
be applied to “employees in the Chicago stockyards” and to “the
workers in a great meatpacking plant.” The same was true of other
manufacturing concerns located in a current of interstate commerce.
“The same reasoning applies to the employees in a great steel mill or
to a truck factory to which materials are sent from other states to be
assembled and shipped on again,” Madden concluded. “The Constitution and the state give the Labor Board jurisdiction over these situ150
ations. . . .”
In contrast to the level of detail in which he covers some of the
political history of the Court-packing plan, Mr. Shesol’s discussion of
the doctrinal issues facing the government lawyers defending the
Wagner Act is rather terse and perfunctory—as if it were a discussion
almost not worth having. He observes that: “According to commerce
clause doctrine . . . some activities had an immediate, direct, or proximate effect on interstate commerce; others, arguably, did not.” (p.
422). “Some companies were located amid the ‘current’ of commerce, others at its beginning or end.” “Some industries were ‘affected with a public interest,’ others were not.” (p. 422). What Mr.
Shesol does not seem to understand is that the category of “business
affected with a public interest” was actually a due process concept rather than a Commerce Clause concept. That concept would play an
important role in determining whether the statute’s collective bar148
149
150

CHARLES LEONARD, A SEARCH FOR A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF 1937, at 109–10 (1971).
IRONS, supra note 48, at 252–53, 268.
3 U.S. L. WEEK 1041, 1041–42 (1936).
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gaining provisions could survive a due process challenge.
Moreover, this due process concept played an important role in the current
of commerce doctrine, under which the Court had held that the only
local businesses that could be located in a stream of interstate commerce and thereby affect that commerce directly were businesses af152
fected with a public interest.
But Mr. Shesol does not appear to
understand this relationship. Instead, he concludes this brief discussion with the vague assertion that “[a]ll these considerations would
have some bearing on the Supreme Court’s verdict on the Wagner
Act.” (p. 422). One is left with the impression that this complicated,
“inexact and inconsistent” body of legal doctrine would have “some
bearing” on the Court’s decision; but what kind of bearing that might
be, and the extent of its influence, are left unstated and unexplored.
Yet even the suggestion that these niceties of constitutional doctrine
might have anything to do with the Court’s disposition again rests
uneasily next to Mr. Shesol’s earlier intimations that the justices were
motivated by ideology and class interests and unconstrained by legal
ideas.
Mr. Shesol argues that on the journey to joining the majority in
the Labor Board decisions, Hughes and Roberts “had traveled different roads, and Roberts had the more difficult passage. Hughes had
taken an expansive view of the commerce power for many years,” da153
ting back to his decision in the Shreveport Rate Case upholding federal regulation of intrastate rates for rail carriage during his term as an
Associate Justice. (p. 431). “His concurrence in Carter twenty years
later was an aberration, born less of conviction than a desire to avoid
the embarrassment of another 5-4 split.” (p. 432). With his “return
to form” in the Labor Board Cases, Mr. Shesol suggests, Hughes was
atoning for his “failure to stand up to the conservatives in Carter . . . .”
“Roberts, by contrast, had tended to take an orthodox view of the
commerce power. He had signed the majority opinion in Carter” and,
as mentioned previously, in Alton “had not only questioned but ridiculed the idea that labor relations had anything to do with interstate
commerce.” (p. 432).

151

152
153

See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 109–38 (detailing how
the due process concept of a business affected with a public interest shaped the analysis
of various labor laws).
Id. at 141–55 (discussing the evolving current of commerce doctrine in connection with
business affected with the public interest).
234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding regulation of intrastate railroad rates under the federal
government’s commerce power).
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The last of these charges we have disposed of earlier. But there
are many other critical things to be said about this set of claims. First,
so far as I am aware, there is absolutely no evidence that Hughes concurred in Carter not out of conviction but in order to avoid the embarrassment of a 5-4 split. The sources to which Mr. Shesol cites do
not support the claim, which appears to be sheer speculation asserted
as fact. Second, if the Chief Justice was trying to avoid a 5-4 split, he
failed to do so: the Court did in fact split 5-4 on the issue of whether
the price regulation provisions of the statute were severable from the
labor regulation provisions. This division led Hughes, Brandeis,
Stone, and Cardozo to affirm the constitutionality of the price regulation provisions—something the majority declined to do on the
grounds that the price regulations were inseverable from the offending labor regulations and therefore must fall along with them. In this
respect Hughes did “stand up to the conservatives in Carter.” (p.
432).
Third, with respect to the issue presented in the Labor Board Cases—whether congressional power under the Commerce Clause
reached labor relations in activities of production—Hughes reached
the same conclusion in Carter as had the majority. Hughes differed
with the majority over the severability of the price regulation provisions, but not over the constitutionality of the labor regulation provisions. He stated categorically: “I agree . . . that production—in this
case mining—which precedes commerce, is not itself commerce; and
that the power to regulate commerce among the several States is not
154
a power to regulate industry within the State.” He went on to add
that a particular provision of the labor title of the Guffey Act was invalid not only on nondelegation and due process grounds, but also because it “goes beyond any proper measure of protection of interstate
commerce and attempts a broad regulation of industry within the
155
State.” “Congress may not use this protective authority as a pretext
for the exertion of power to regulate activities and relations within
the States which affect interstate commerce only indirectly,” Hughes
insisted. “Otherwise, in view of the multitude of indirect effects,
Congress in its discretion could assume control of virtually all the activities of the people to the subversion of the fundamental principle
156
of the Constitution.” In short, Hughes’s position on the Commerce
Clause issue was no less orthodox than that of Roberts. The fact that

154
155
156

Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 317 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., separate opinion).
Id. at 318–19.
Id. at 317–18.
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Roberts joined the majority opinion and Hughes concurred does not
differentiate their positions on that issue.
Fourth, the difference of opinion between Hughes and Roberts
on the Commerce Clause issue in Alton was irrelevant to the issue
presented in the Labor Board Cases. All of the justices agreed that the
employment relations of interstate railroads could be regulated by
Congress in some respects, including the protection of selforganization and the requirement of collective bargaining. This
much the Railway Labor Act cases, the Federal Hours of Service Act
cases, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases, and the Federal
Safety Appliance Act cases made clear. The question in Alton was
whether the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to mandate the
creation of an employer-funded pension system for workers who were
admitted by all to be engaged in interstate commerce. The question
in the Labor Board Cases, by contrast, was whether the effects of the activities of employees engaged in manufacturing could support congressional jurisdiction. The Labor Board Cases concerned the depth of
the commerce power’s penetration into areas of conventional state
authority, such as production; Alton concerned the scope of that
power’s lateral reach with respect to employees admittedly engaged
in interstate commerce.
The irrelevance of Alton to the disposition of the commerce power
issue in the Labor Board Cases becomes apparent when one investigates the manner in which the precedent was treated in that litigation. The Jones & Laughlin Corporation did tersely invoke Alton in
157
its brief, but everyone else treated the case as inapposite. The brief
158
for the NLRB felt no need to engage it; the lower federal court decisions invalidating the application of the Act to the various manufac159
turing concerns did not invoke it; Chief Justice Hughes felt no need

157

158

159

See 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 333, 354, 371, 385, 414 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1975) (providing examples of how the Jones & Laughlin Court cited Alton in its brief; for
instance, at 333 as the last case in string-cite; at 354 and 371 as “see also” cites; at 385, reiterating point made at 354; and at 414 within a due process argument).
There was only one inconsequential citation of Alton in the NLRB’s brief. See id. at 250
(“The comment of the Court in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, is
apt here (p. 373): ‘The meaning of the commerce and due process clauses of the Constitution is not so easily enlarged by the voluntary acts of individuals or corporations.’”).
The brief did not treat it as a precedent the Government needed to distinguish.
See the reproduction of the circuit court opinions in Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1, 79–84 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (describing in
detail three lower court cases without mentioning Alton).
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160

to grapple with it in his majority opinion; and the Four Horsemen
161
This strongly suggests
in dissent did not so much as mention it.
that the Government lawyers arguing the cases, and the judges and
justices adjudicating them, did not view the Commerce Clause holding in Alton as having any bearing on the issues raised in the Labor
Board Cases.
With respect to the Commerce Clause issue presented in the Labor
Board Cases—whether the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to
regulate the labor relations of employers engaged in production—
the records of Hughes and Roberts revealed no meaningful differences. Roberts had joined Hughes’s majority opinion in Schechter. As
mentioned previously, they had reached the same conclusions in
Carter Coal with respect to the power of Congress to regulate labor relations at the mine. In 1933 both Hughes and Roberts had joined
Sutherland’s opinion holding that, because the effect on interstate
commerce of a union’s attempt to secure a closed shop through a
strike and boycott of a structural steel manufacturer was “indirect,” it
was beyond the reach of the commerce power under the Sherman
162
Act. With respect to the question of federal power to regulate production, Hughes had joined Roberts’s opinion in Butler restricting
the power of Congress to do so through conditional spending. Indeed, Justice Stone reported that when Hughes presented the Butler
case to the conference, he denounced the AAA as “a regulation of agriculture within the states and an invasion of the reserved powers of
163
the states.” In the month preceding Butler Hughes had joined Roberts’ opinion invalidating a regulatory federal excise tax on liquor
dealers on the ground that it constituted “a clear invasion of the po164
lice power, inherent in the States . . . .” So far as I am aware, there
was not a single case in which Hughes and Roberts had reached divergent conclusions on the power of the federal government to regulate local activities of production under the Commerce Clause.
It is true that as an Associate Justice, Hughes had written in the
Minnesota Rate Cases that “the execution by Congress of its constitu160
161
162

163
164

See id. at 30–43 (citing and discussing many contemporary commerce clause cases but not
mentioning Alton).
See id. at 76–103 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (neglecting to mention Alton even in dissenting opinion).
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 (1933) (“If thereby the shipment
of steel in interstate commerce was curtailed, that result was incidental, indirect and remote, and, therefore, not within the anti-trust acts . . . .”).
Memorandum Re: n. 401, United States v. Butler (Feb. 4, 1936) (Harlan Fiske Stone MSS,
Box 62, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935).
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tional power to regulate interstate commerce is not limited by the
fact that intrastate transactions may have become so interwoven
therewith that the effective government of the former incidentally
165
controls the latter,” and that this premise formed the basis of his
opinion in the Shreveport Rate Cases holding that Congress could regulate the intrastate rates charged by interstate rail carriers where it was
necessary to prevent discrimination against interstate commerce. But
one must exercise care in attributing too much significance to these
statements and decisions. For a short time before Hughes wrote these opinions, he joined a unanimous decision in which it was stated
that Congress may protect interstate commerce “no matter what may
166
be the source of the dangers which threaten it.” The author of that
opinion upholding the Federal Safety Appliance Act was Willis Van
Devanter, whose views of the commerce power were quite orthodox.
In fact, Van Devanter joined Hughes’s opinions in both the Minnesota
Rate Cases and in Shreveport. So did Justice Day, who four years later
167
would write the majority opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart. The ma168
jor opinions applying and extending the Shreveport doctrine were
169
typically unanimous, and indeed Justices Sutherland and Van De170
vanter each authored one of them. And Justice Roberts apparently
felt no difficulty in joining opinions applying the Shreveport doc-

165
166
167
168

169

170

Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913).
S. Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911).
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
See Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1, 12 (1934) (citing Shreveport for the proposition
that Congress has the power to require that intrastate rates may not be used to hinder interstate commerce); United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70, 74 (1933) (applying the
Shreveport rule that Congress has the power to protect interstate shippers from discriminatory intrastate rates); Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 164 (1926) (“The jurisdiction exercised by the Commission in these cases is in essence that which was invoked in
The Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 342, a power to prevent unjust preference to particular intrastate shippers or localities at the demonstrated expense of interstate commerce.”); Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456, 485 (1924) (citing Shreveport for
the proposition that federal control of intrastate commerce is appropriate when necessary for the maintenance of adequate interstate commerce); R.R. Comm’n of Chicago v.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., Co. 257 U.S. 563 (1922) (applying generally the
Shreveport discrimination rule).
At least the opinions were unanimous as to the constitutional issue. See United States v.
Village of Hubbard, 266 U.S. 474, 480–81 (1925) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (writing
separately to call the Court to address the limits of the Interstate Commerce Act). In
American Express Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617, 629 (1917), Justice
McKenna dissented without opinion. McKenna had joined the majority in Shreveport, so it
is unlikely that his dissent was based on the Commerce Clause issue.
See Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229, 230 (1929); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. State Pub.
Utils. Comm’n, 245 U.S. 493, 502 (1918).
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171

trine. Perhaps this may be attributed to the fact that the Shreveport
doctrine was widely understood to be confined to the domain of rail
transportation. No federal court relied on the Shreveport doctrine to
support federal regulatory power outside the railroad context until
172
1934, and the Supreme Court did not do so until 1937. A quick review of the United States Reports similarly discloses no reliance on the
precedent by counsel in the major commerce power cases decided in
173
the two decades following its announcement.
When Justice
Cardozo wrote in his Carter Coal dissent that federal regulation of the
price at which coal was sold in intrastate commerce could be upheld
“[w]ithin rulings the most orthodox,” he relied upon the Shreveport
174
Case and its progeny as the authority for this assertion.
There was
nothing “unorthodox” about Hughes’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
In short, there appears to be no warrant for Mr. Shesol’s claim
that the Labor Board Cases marked a “return to form” for Hughes, but
not for Roberts. Insofar as the questions of federal power raised in
those cases were concerned, the antecedent views of the two Justices
were substantially identical. Yet Mr. Shesol contends that “[t]he same
pressures—doctrinal, political, personal” (we are left to guess about
the comparative significance of each of these)—“that had nudged
Roberts into the liberal camp”—note again the language of attitudinalism—“on the minimum wage had also, it now appeared, changed
his mind about the commerce clause.” (p. 432). Yet there is an important difference in Mr. Shesol’s analysis of the role played by these
pressures in Parrish and the Labor Board Cases, respectively. With re171

172

173

174

See, e.g., Florida, 292 U.S. at 12 (citing Shreveport for the proposition that Congress may
require that intrastate agencies to operate in a way that does not cripple interstate commerce); Louisiana, 290 U.S. at 70 (applying the Shreveport rule that the federal government can prohibit intrastate economic practices that are prejudicial to interstate commerce).
Cushman, supra note 79, at 1130–31 (2000) (“For if you Shepardize Shreveport, you will
find that every case following it from its announcement in 1914 up to the mid-1930s involved regulation of a business affected with a public interest: railroads.”).
For examples of major commerce power cases that do not cite Shreveport, see, e.g., United
Leather Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 458–61 (1924). See
also United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 350–81 (1922); Stafford v.
Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 503–12 (1922). Shreveport was invoked at argument in Bd. of Trade
of the City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 16–31 (1923), but by the party arguing that the
Grain Futures Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 24. It was not referred to in the decision
upholding the Act.
Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 328–29 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (citing
Shreveport for the proposition that Congress has the power to protect the business of interstate rail carriers when local rates are so low that they divert business from interstate
competitors).
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spect to Parrish, recall that Mr. Shesol merely argues that such pressures prompted Hughes and Roberts to face the constitutional issue
squarely and to express their actual views on the merits. In that case,
Mr. Shesol was not prepared to “suggest that either justice changed
his basic beliefs in the face of events.” (p. 415). In the Labor Board
Cases, by contrast, Mr. Shesol asserts that these pressures compelled
Roberts—but not Hughes—to change his mind on a matter of doctrine. But in view of the substantial identity of their views of the
scope of federal power to regulate production, if the Labor Board Cases marked a change of mind rather than a return to form for Roberts,
then they did so for Hughes as well.
It is my view that the Labor Board Cases marked a significant doctrinal departure for neither justice, and there were many contemporaries who took the same view. Numerous commentators writing in
the pages of the law journals perceived no significant discontinuity in
Commerce Clause doctrine, and many lower federal court judges,
both Democratic and Republican appointees, believed that Carter
175
Coal remained good law. As Solicitor General Stanley Reed wrote to
Homer Cummings: “I do not see any clear inconsistency between
Wagner on the one hand and the Guffey or N.R.A. decision on the
other. The Wagner decision is based on the right to remedy situations which obstruct or tend to obstruct interstate commerce. The
Guffey and the Poultry Code were aimed directly at wages, hours, and
176
labor conditions.” These observers believed that the craftsmanlike
labors of the draftsmen who prepared the statute and the efforts of
the government lawyers who selected, cultivated, briefed, and argued
the test cases had not been superfluous, but in fact had played a vital
role in reconciling the Administration’s regulatory ambitions with the
governing constitutional authorities. Surely it is an overstatement to
assert, as Mr. Shesol does, that the Labor Board Cases recognized “a
federal government with all the authority it needed, unencumbered
by the doctrine of state sovereignty” and “opened the door to a dramatic expansion of federal power.” (p. 434). As Hughes wrote in the
Jones & Laughlin opinion: “Undoubtedly the scope of this power
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government
and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of
175
176

See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 177–80 (recounting
the political and academic reaction to the Labor Board Cases).
Stanley Reed, Memorandum for the Attorney General, April 22, 1937, National Archives,
Washington, D.C., Dept. of Justice 114-115-2, quoted in LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 33, at
318–19.
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our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely cen177
tralized government. The question is necessarily one of degree.”
Mr. Shesol maintains that “virtually everyone on both sides of the
fight believed: that the Supreme Court, seeking to save itself from
being packed, had simply surrendered. The Court had bent so as not
to break.” (p. 434). But this assessment of the doctrinal significance
of the opinions and their intended effect on the Court-packing plan
is belied by the Administration’s own reactions to the decisions. Indeed, part of the reason that Roosevelt continued to resist compromise on the Court-packing bill even after the decisions in the Labor
Board Cases was that he, unlike Mr. Shesol, did not see the Court’s decisions as dramatically expanding the scope of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. As Mr. Shesol himself reports:
Analyses by Justice Department lawyers concluded that “the new definition of interstate commerce rests on a precarious foundation” and that
the Court still “may not sustain any of” the wages and hours bill that Cohen and Corcoran were drafting. Federal regulation of that nature
might still be out of bounds. The Jones & Laughlin decision, as some (including Hughes) pointed out, was not wholly out of keeping with existing
doctrine; it modified existing paradigms (the “direct-indirect” test;
“stream of commerce” theory) rather than upending them. And because
the opinion had not overruled Carter or Schechter but merely dismissed
them as “not controlling here,” they could still be cited as precedent.

(p. 438).
So, when asked by a reporter about the effect of the Wagner Act
opinions on the Court bill, FDR replied that those decisions were limited to collective bargaining. He said he had asked his advisers
whether the decisions applied to child labor, or minimum wages, or
maximum hours; their reply, he said, was ‘the Lord only knows!’” (p.
437). And Mr. Shesol stresses that:
Roosevelt’s skepticism was not just for show. It reflected a consensus
among his advisers that while the administration had reclaimed a bit of
lost ground, two thirds of all workers—those in service jobs and in industries that were clearly intrastate in character—had nothing to gain from
the decisions. Also, as Robert Jackson recalled, Roosevelt and his aides
felt that as great as the victory appeared, the justices were “now going to
whittle it down by decision of individual cases until it won’t mean anything.” . . . So Roosevelt saw no choice but to keep on fighting . . . .

(p. 438).

177

Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (internal
citations omitted).
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This leaves one wondering why, if the Court “had simply surrendered” in the Labor Board Cases, it did not do so clearly enough to
achieve the putative objective of getting the Administration off of its
back. If the aim was to assure New Dealers that the Court had capitulated to their constitutional vision, one wonders, then why did
Hughes write an opinion leaving so many of them doubtful that the
Court had in fact done so?
Mr. Shesol is prepared to concede that the matter may have been
more complicated. “‘Actual experience,’” he recognizes, “—in the
form of the sit-down strikes—may too have had an effect” on Roberts’
votes in the Labor Board Cases. (p. 432). This impresses me as the
more plausible claim—with respect to both Roberts and Hughes—
but it must be analyzed with care. First, as Melvyn Dubofsky has observed, the scale of industrial unrest in 1937 was not historically singular. “[O]nly 7.2 per cent of employed workers were involved in
walkouts . . . and their absence from work represented only 0.0043
178
per cent of all time worked.” These percentages were approximately the same as those experienced during the strike wave of 1934,
which Commissioner of Labor Statistics Isadore Lubin had concluded
“could not match 1919 in intensity, duration, or number of workers
involved.” Second, it appears that the United Auto Workers, who
waged the largest and most serious set of sit-down strikes, did so because they doubted (quite reasonably, it appears) that they had sufficient votes to win recognition elections under the provisions of the
179
Wagner Act. It is therefore not clear that upholding the Act offered
any meaningful prospect of ameliorating those particular labor disturbances. Moreover, the largest of those strikes—the one at the
General Motors plant in Flint, Michigan—was actually settled on February 11, 1937, the day that the Labor Board Cases were being argued,
180
and more than two months before the Court rendered its decisions.
The “actual experience” of the sit-down strikes may, however, have
persuaded the justices of the accuracy of the Government’s theory of
the cases: that a labor disturbance at a manufacturing plant could
cause a blockage in a flow of interstate commerce, and that the fed178
179

180

Melvyn Dubofsky, Not So “‘Turbulent Years”’: Another Look at the American 1930’s, 24 Amerikastudien 5, 12–-13 (1979).
See id. at 16 (“[T]he sit-down technique was chosen consciously to compensate for the
union’s lack of a mass membership base.”); SIDNEY FINE, SIT-DOWN: THE GENERAL
MOTORS STRIKE OF 1936–1937, at 111, 118–19, 144, 181–82, 185–88, 255–56 (1969) (describing the history of the strike and the social and political forces that shaped it); J.
WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 124–26, 137
(1968) (“The UAW was then too weak to risk elections.”).
FINE, supra note 179, at 303–12 (describing the settlement of the GM strike).
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eral government was empowered to employ reasonable means to prevent such blockages from occurring, and to dislodge them once they
had formed. In the peroration of his argument before the Court,
Labor Department solicitor Charles Wyzanski alluded to the sit-down
strikes in Michigan immediately before concluding that: “where two
colossal forces are standing astride the stream of commerce threatening to disrupt it, it cannot be that this Government is without power
to provide for the orderly procedure by which the dispute may be ad181
justed without interruption to the stream of commerce.” Here we
see an instance in which emphasis on the significance of an external
factor—a social fact that was not part of the formal record before the
Court—if properly understood, is congruent with an internal account.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL STORIES
Mr. Shesol’s final analysis of the relationship between the political
story and the legal story reproduces the tensions manifest in his relation of the legal story. Here again, internal and external factors lie
together uneasily. To his credit, he recognizes that the constitutional
revolution that culminated in the affirmation of the New Deal order
was spread out over a longer period of time than the familiar reference to the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937” would suggest. He
rejects Edward Corwin’s assertion that American constitutional law
181

Arguments in Cases Arising Under Labor Acts Before the Supreme Court, Sen. Doc. 52
(75-1), 173–74 (1935). Mr. Shesol makes fewer mistakes in his briefer discussion of the
Social Security Cases, though he does make the occasional curious claim. For instance, he
notes that Cardozo voted in conference with Stone, Brandeis, and Roberts “to dismiss the
challenge to the pensions provision on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing to
sue. Hughes, however, had insisted on hearing the case, possibly with an eye to ending
the term emphatically with another landmark liberal decision.” Why Brandeis, Stone,
and Cardozo would have been opposed to ending the term in this manner is not clear.
Mr. Shesol adds that at the conference Hughes “joined the four conservatives (whose motives, surely, were different than his) in voting to consider the act on the merits.” SHESOL,
supra note 2, at 435. The inference to be drawn here is that the conservatives voted to
decide the case on the merits because they wanted to invalidate those provisions of the
statute. This might make sense had the vote on the merits been 5-4 in favor of upholding
the statute. But the tally was 7-2. Van Devanter and Sutherland voted with Hughes in the
majority. Mr. Shesol also maintains that Cardozo “did affirm the portion of the AAA ruling that concerned the general welfare clause, but effectively reversed the part that constrained the taxing and spending power.” Id. at 454. Mr. Shesol does not explain this
claim, so it is not clear on what he bases it. But it is worth pointing out that justices such
as Hughes, Roberts, Van Devanter, and Sutherland may very well have thought that there
was an important distinction to be drawn between using the fiscal powers to regulate agricultural production in the states and using those powers to finance retirement pensions
and unemployment benefits.
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had never undergone a revolution “‘so radical, so swift, so altogether
dramatic’ as the one the Supreme Court completed during those few
months of 1937” as “premature—but only slightly.” (p. 519). “Just as
the revolution took some time to set in motion—the first shots, with
hindsight, appear to have been cases like Nebbia and Blaisdell (both in
1934), or even their antecedents,” he observes, “it took some time to
complete.” (p. 519). Perhaps thinking of such Commerce Clause
landmarks as United States v. Darby (1941) and Wickard v. Filburn
(1942), Mr. Shesol agrees that “several years would pass before Jones
& Laughlin and other liberal triumphs had the ring of finality.” (p.
519).
Mr. Shesol also recognizes the importance of transformative Court
appointments to the advancement and consolidation of the constitutional revolution. “It is unlikely,” he writes, “that the transformation
in the Court’s outlook would have been either sweeping or enduring
without a concurrent transformation in its personnel.” (p. 519). Mr.
Shesol continues:
By 1942, Roosevelt—who had completed his entire first term as president
without naming a single justice—had appointed all the justices of the Supreme Court but two: Stone, whom FDR elevated to chief justice when
Hughes retired in 1941, and Roberts. This new Court, which included
Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson, effectively settled the argument
that had dominated Roosevelt’s first term as well as the preceding three
decades—the judicial and political debate over the constitutionality of
economic reform. Congressional power to regulate commerce, the majority now ruled, was virtually without limit. The increasingly nebulous
distinction between “direct” and “indirect” commerce [effects] was finally
discarded.

(pp. 519–20).
Mr. Shesol further reports that “[d]ecisions grounded in . . . the
due process clause [and] the contracts clause”—which he persists in
characterizing as “the unloved doctrinal legacies of laissez-faire”—
“were overturned in short succession, leaving no major area of consti182
tutional law unaltered. The Court, at long last, had reconciled itself
to the twentieth century.” (p. 520).
Roosevelt thought that this process had taken “too long,” but Mr.
Shesol quite judiciously sees some value in gradual, deliberate
change. He finds appealing “another way of looking at the lag between his signing of New Deal laws and the Court’s endorsement of
them. ‘In a democracy,’” [Roosevelt’s] former aide Stanley High
wrote, “‘people have time to catch their breath.’ And the Constitu182

For an exploration of potential limits on the commerce power that lingered into the early
1940s, see CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 212–19.
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tion, as James Bryce observed years earlier, ‘secures time for deliberation. It forces the people to think seriously before they alter it or
pardon a transgression of it.’” So
whatever the motives of Roosevelt’s critics, it must be acknowledged that
they provoked a debate about the constitutional principles of the New
Deal—a debate that arguably needed to take place and that the congressional opposition was too enfeebled to lead. The belief in strict limitations of governmental power, having held sway in courtrooms for decades, deserved to be heard one more time by the bench, the public, and
the president himself. Not to be heeded, necessarily, but at least to be
heard. Beginning with the first New Deal cases, the Court required FDR
to answer a serious and sustained constitutional critique. In the end, his
position prevailed; and his reforms, most people agreed, stood on more
solid ground.

(pp. 520–21).
As Hughes declared before a joint session of Congress in January
of 1939: “‘If our checks and balances sometimes prevent the speedy
action which is thought desirable . . . they also assure in the long run
a more deliberate judgment. And what the people really want they
generally get.’” (p. 528).
Yet even here Mr. Shesol reverts to characterizing Hughes and
Roberts as the moving parts in the story. Roosevelt’s transformative
appointments were necessary, Mr. Shesol explains, because “Hughes
and Roberts soon parted company with the Court’s true liberals,
though not in every case and not quite to the degree that Roosevelt
had feared. After 1937, the two swing justices were more inclined
than before to sustain economic regulations but were less deferential
toward the other branches than their newer brethren were.” (p. 519)
The suggestion again is that Hughes and Roberts became more liberal in 1937, then became more conservative thereafter, though not as
conservative as they had been in 1935 and 1936. Left unexplored is
the possibility that they voted more frequently (though not invariably) to uphold economic regulations in 1937 and thereafter because
the statutes that came before the Court in those years in their view
typically rested on a surer constitutional foundation—owing in no
small part to the lessons that legislative draftsmen and government
183
lawyers had learned from the legal failures of the early New Deal.
Indeed, Mr. Shesol’s final analysis of the crisis strongly reasserts
the language of movement that has suffused his account, and his verdict on the justices in motion is not altogether kind. He regards it as
“an abiding irony that so much of this constitutional revolu183

See id. at 182–207; Cushman, supra note 51 (explaining how congressional draftsmen reworked legislation to respond to the constitutional concerns of Supreme Court justices).
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tion . . . occurred during the tenure of Charles Evans Hughes,” the
Man on the Flying Trapeze. (p. 521). As New York’s governor,
Hughes “had been known as a reformer, but never a revolutionary.”
Hughes “placed his faith” in “rational, gradual process, the slow unfolding and maturing of ideas.” (p. 521). “Through the 1935–36
term this left him uncomfortably—and untenably—caught between
the Court’s two camps.” “At the height of the constitutional crisis,”
Mr. Shesol reports in what he regards as a telling episode, “a dance
company performed an interpretation of the Supreme Court. The
three liberals danced on one side, the five conservatives (including
Roberts) on the other, and Hughes flitted back and forth between
them. This once godlike man had become a tragic, or tragicomic,
figure.” (p. 521). In 1936, Pearson and Allen charged that Hughes
“became a weak-kneed oscillator between the two wings of the Court,
184
until he fell, discredited and exhausted, in the middle.” Appropriating their vocabulary, Mr. Shesol asserts that “like Roberts, Hughes
swung back and forth as if he believed that the mere fact of his oscillation, his refusal to alight for long in either camp, established some
kind of balance.” (p. 521). But if this was his strategy, Mr. Shesol
concludes, it did not succeed. “If a middle ground existed on that
bitterly divided Court, the Chief Justice never found it.” (p. 521). Instead, as he writes of Tipaldo, while “Hughes still clung to the center,
185
it was an illusion, a vacuum, a vanishing point.” (p. 220).
Mr. Shesol insists that it was “unfair” for the Chief Justice’s critics
to cast him as “King Canute, foolishly trying to reverse the tide.” (p.
521). “Hughes was not trying to hold the law or the nation back; rather, he seemed to believe that he could advance the interpretation
of the Constitution by minute degrees, by fine shadings, by cleverly
distinguishing away precedents instead of boldly overruling them.”
True, “the judicial process is most often an incremental one.” (p.
521). But Hughes, we are told, wasn’t always mindful of what Mr.
Shesol understands: that “there are times when progress—in law and
policy—must be made by bold strokes and clean breaks, if the government is not to fall dangerously out of step with social and economic realities. The 1930s was one of those times.” (pp. 521–22).
184
185

PEARSON & ALLEN, supra note 55, at 97.
This rather sharp judgment is particularly curious in view of the fact that Brandeis, Stone,
and Cardozo each explicitly joined Hughes’s Tipaldo dissent, 298 U.S. 587, 631 (1936),
and that Stone began his separate dissent, which was joined by Brandeis and Cardozo,
with the affirmation: “I agree with all that the Chief Justice has said.” Id. When four justices of the caliber of Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo all have agreed with a particular legal conclusion, one might reflect long and hard before pronouncing it illusory
or vacuous.
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Mr. Shesol grants that: “Whether the Chief Justice saw himself as
responding to the dictates of the cases at hand, or was acting to save
the Court or country” in 1937 “can never be known . . . .” (p. 522).
But he does not appear to take seriously the possibility that Hughes
might have been voting his conscience in the cases that came before
the Court all along, and that whether he ended up voting with the
“liberals” or the “conservatives” turned on the particular issues presented in particular cases. Instead he credits Hughes with having
“‘the acumen to recognize the inevitable.’” (p. 522). He recognized
that the Court could not continue to resist “‘the popular urge . . . for
what in effect was a unified economy.’” He came to this realization
“too late to prevent some of the worst excesses of the 1935–36 term,
but soon enough to undermine the Court bill and then to lead a
steady, purposeful march toward a more flexible interpretation of the
Constitution.” (p. 522). In the end, Hughes “kept faith” with the
man he had been in 1910, when he had “advised a group of Yale students that ‘whether you like it or not, the majority will rule. . . . I believe you will come to put your trust, as I do, in the common sense of
the people of this country, and in the verdicts they give.’” (p. 522).
But this portrayal of Hughes as a re-converted simple majoritarian
cannot account for the fact that he continued in 1937 and thereafter
to vote to invalidate economic regulations that he thought violated
186
the Constitution.
Nor can it explain his hesitation to uphold the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act regulating wages and
hours of all employees engaged in “production for commerce” under
187
the commerce power in United States v. Darby. To the end of his judicial career, Hughes continued to maintain that the Constitution
placed significant limits on the power of the people’s democraticallyelected representatives in the domain of political economy.
At the end of his account, Mr. Shesol frankly engages the debate
between internalists and externalists, and he has some critical things
186

187

See Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (invalidating a gas proration order issued by the Rail Road Commission of Texas); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937) (holding that an economic regulation
that discriminated between mutual companies and stock companies violated the equal
protection clause); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 584–
85 (1940) (Roberts, J., McReynolds, J., and Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
opinion upholding a commission’s oil proration order); United States v. Rock-Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 583–87 (1939) (Roberts, J., and Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting
because the order in question deprived the appellees of their property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 208–09 (“At the Darby
conference, Hughes expressed substantial reservations about the power of Congress to
regulate all ‘production for commerce.’”).
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to say to each camp. In the course of his discussion he reveals that he
does not understand the debate very well, and he attributes to at least
some of the participants anxieties about adjudication, and aspirations
to resolve global questions about judicial behavior, that I do not believe they harbor. In addition, he contradicts his own dominant historiographical premises, and he fails to provide any useful framework
for evaluating the questions of causation that have so engaged academic historians.
Mr. Shesol notes that: “Hughes objected violently to the idea that
any decision of the period was ‘influenced in the slightest degree by
the President’s attitude, or his proposal to reorganize the Court.’
The claim, he insisted, was ‘utterly baseless.’” (p. 523). He correctly
reports that, though many contemporaries subscribed to the switchin-time thesis, “[d]ecades later . . . a number of historians, legal
scholars, and others would question the claim. Some, like Chief Justice William Rehnquist, agreed that Roosevelt won the war, but believe that ‘he won it the way the Constitution envisions such wars being won—by the gradual process of changing the federal judiciary
through the appointment process.’ Others place greater weight on
the doctrinal changes that preceded the Court fight and doubt that
the events of 1936 and 1937 had much (or anything) to do with the
shift in doctrine.” (pp. 522–23).
Mr. Shesol maintains that this debate rests on “a false dichotomy.”
This may be true, but if it is, it is certainly not the dichotomy that Mr.
Shesol describes. He poses the dichotomy as one between “the idea
that the Court is either a purely legal institution or a political body,”
between the claims “that justices are either impervious to social, polit188
ical, and cultural influences or utterly at their mercy.”
The internalist position is, on this account, particularly laughable. Such people apparently believe that the Court is “a vacuum,” that the Court
building “‘has a soundproof room.’” They subscribe to “the myth of
the Court as “a ‘vehicle of revealed truth’ (as one scholar put it, sardonically), incapable of doing that which the law and the facts did
not require . . . .” (p. 523).
It is hard to know about which participants in the current debate
Mr. Shesol is writing here—the sardonic quotation is from the title of
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Among the other “many unhelpful antitheses that prevailed at the time and persist to this
day” that Mr. Shesol indicts in this passage are the ideas “that the framers’ intentions are
either easily discernible or always ambiguous (or even irrelevant)” and “that legal doctrines are either preordained by the Constitution or are artificial constructs . . . .”
SHESOL, supra note 2, at 523.
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a book published by Alpheus Thomas Mason in 1953 —but the views
outlined by Mr. Shesol do not correspond to those of any constitutional historian of the period with whose work I am familiar. These
antitheses are built on a misunderstanding of the debate. The participants have not sought to determine what “the Court is” or how “justices are.” They have been interested in understanding the best explanation of certain events and their causes. Various participants see
various internal and external factors as having greater or lesser explanatory power with respect to those events. But so far as I am
aware, no one takes the extreme positions with which Mr. Shesol
takes issue. It is no revelation that the “reality . . . is more complex”
(p. 523) than the caricatured options Mr. Shesol has presented. Everyone understands that.
Mr. Shesol then goes on to assert that: “At its core, this is not a
debate about the timing of the transformation. It is an argument
about the nature of the judicial process, and what makes judges decide as they do.” (p. 523). I won’t presume to speak for others, but I
will hazard the assumption that I am not alone in thinking that the
debate is in fact about the timing of and the reasons for the transformation. It is not about an attempt to understand the nature of the
judicial process, nor about what makes judges decide as they do. It is
instead an effort to understand particular historical actions of particular historical actors, to achieve the best understanding of a discrete
historical phenomenon, rather than to derive covering laws that
might apply across person, place, and time. I would consider it irresponsible to infer from the resolution of that discrete issue any universal proposition about whether we live under the rule of law or the
rule of men, and I assume that my colleagues on both sides of the
debate generally would agree.
Because he misunderstands the nature of the enterprise in which
constitutional historians have been engaged, Mr. Shesol misdiagnoses
the motivations of those who find the internalist account more persuasive. “To acknowledge that external events play a role in decisions
is frightening to many,” Mr. Shesol explains, “for it suggests that the
judicial system is, in the end, not one of laws but of men—and thus
vulnerable to the prejudices and whims and base instincts of men.”
(p. 523). This is a substantial sociological claim, and yet Mr. Shesol
presents no evidence to support it. Such a speculative claim to psycho-historiographical insight reminds one of Justice Cardozo’s famous dissent in United States v. Constantine, where he ridiculed the
189
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Court’s invalidation of a federal tax on liquor dealers. Notwithstanding the “professed” purpose of the statute to raise revenue, Cardozo
observed, the majority held that another, illegitimate purpose “not
professed, may be read beneath the surface,” and on the basis of that
imputed purpose the statute was declared invalid. “Thus,” Cardozo
concluded, “the process of psychoanalysis has spread to unaccus190
tomed fields.”
In venturing his own recipe for analysis, Mr. Shesol makes some
statements that many readers may find hard to take. “Too often,” he
tells us, “the Hughes Court’s internal conflict has been portrayed as
one between liberal justices who were responsive to the national
emergency and conservative justices who were indifferent to it.” (p.
191
524).
This might be seen as a little much coming from someone
who has argued that Sutherland and his fellow conservatives’ response to the New Deal and their defense of “indifferent government” was driven by a devotion to the “stern discipline” of a Spencerian “severity” that would “exterminate” the “incapable,” the
“imprudent,” the “idle,” and the “weak.” (p. 69). Mr. Shesol then
tells us that: “Like all judges, the Nine Old Men were imbued with an
ethic of impartiality.” (p. 523). Again, this contention rests uneasily
next to his earlier claims that the Four Horsemen were driven by a
fanatical devotion to Social Darwinism and laissez-faire. “They were
constrained by precedent, procedure, doctrine”—how doctrine differs from precedent in Mr. Shesol’s view is not entirely clear—“and
the particular cases in front of them, all of which limited their range
of maneuver.” (p. 523). But recall that much of Mr. Shesol’s account is written as if these internal legal factors did not in fact operate as meaningful constraints on judicial action, which was instead
determined by extra-legal factors. Moreover, if their “range of maneuver” was limited by these internal legal factors, then how were the
justices to make the “bold strokes and clean breaks” that Mr. Shesol
calls for?
Mr. Shesol asserts more plausibly—if uncontroversially—that the
justices “were not merely judges; they were men—politically minded
and socially aware men. All, to varying degrees, were attuned to
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United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 298–99 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
See SHESOL, supra note 2, at 524 (“In truth, both sides responded to the emergency as they
themselves defined it: the liberals by giving the other branches of government greater
room to relieve human suffering through new experiments; the conservatives by waging a
last stand for ‘individual initiative, self-reliance, and other cardinal virtues which I was always taught were necessary to develop a real democracy,’ as George Sutherland wrote a
friend in 1937.”).
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changes in the climate of opinion and mindful of the level of public
esteem for their institution and themselves as individuals.” (pp. 523–
24). This may be so, but note that it does not do a great deal to help
explain the continued resistance of the Four Horsemen. Those justices do not seem to have had much interest in making sure that they
got on the right side of history.
Mr. Shesol concludes that the justices “were neither oblivious to
life outside their chambers nor immune to feelings of pride, shame,
vanity, rage, regret . . . .” (p. 524). “They were capable of change:
growth, regression, and inconsistency. They were, again to different
degrees, open to influence by legal briefs, oral arguments, pressure
from their peers, and, not least, national events.” (p. 524).
All of this is perfectly plausible, but with the possible exception of
the minimum wage cases, Mr. Shesol offers no sustained effort to
identify the salient causal elements and to demonstrate the causal relationships in any individual instance. Instead, this passage again
calls attention to the lack of a sense of historiographical coherence in
Mr. Shesol’s account. He has tried to place what he sees as all of the
potentially relevant factors on the table, but he never does so in a way
that helps the reader to make sense of the Court’s pattern of behavior. The challenge, as I see it, is to integrate the various factors that
one believes help to explain the Court’s behavior into an account
that helps the reader to understand how these factors were related—
not just that they are possible explanatory variables. In Mr. Shesol’s
case, the challenge is heightened due to the fact that some portions
of his interpretive account conflict with or are at least in considerable
tension with other portions.
This may in part account for the fact that Mr. Shesol ultimately
does not confront that challenge. Instead, on the crucial issue, he
punts. “It is, in the end, impossible to know what sways a judge,” he
concludes. (p. 524). “Even the judges themselves do not always know
whether their decisions are driven, in the main, by doctrine or emotion, by the dictates of law or politics or conscience.” (p. 524). And
so Mr. Shesol leaves us with the rather unsatisfying thought that the
truth lies somewhere between two utterly implausible alternatives that
no serious constitutional historian embraces, and that we cannot expect to do much better than that. Just as he complains of Hughes’s
judicial performance, Mr. Shesol’s account vacillates between internal
and external explanations, but ultimately he never finds a firm “middle ground” on which to stand. Perhaps it is Mr. Shesol, rather than
Chief Justice Hughes, who is The Man on the Flying Trapeze.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Shesol’s rendering of the political story in Supreme Power is
very nicely done. But his account of the legal story is far more problematic, and must be consumed with great caution. Moreover, the
interpretive ambivalence that permeates his recounting of the legal
story hampers his efforts to specify the relationship between the legal
and political stories. These shortcomings will limit the book’s value
to scholars.
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